Persuasion and Manipulation: Relevance Across Multiple Audiences by Sparks, Kevin
University of North Dakota 
UND Scholarly Commons 
Theses and Dissertations Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects 
5-2012 
Persuasion and Manipulation: Relevance Across Multiple 
Audiences 
Kevin Sparks 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/theses 
 Part of the Linguistics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sparks, Kevin, "Persuasion and Manipulation: Relevance Across Multiple Audiences" (2012). Theses and 
Dissertations. 4109. 
https://commons.und.edu/theses/4109 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects at UND 
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator 
of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
 
PERSUASION AND MANIPULATION: 
RELEVANCE ACROSS MULTIPLE AUDIENCES 
by 
Kevin Sparks 
Bachelor of Arts, Taylor University, 2004 
A Thesis 
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty 
of the 
University of North Dakota 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Master of Arts  






This thesis, submitted by Kevin Sparks in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
Degree of Master of Arts from the University of North Dakota, has been read by the Faculty 
Advisory Committee under whom the work has been done and is hereby approved. 
             _____________________________________________________ 
                Chairperson 
                   _____________________________________________________ 
             _____________________________________________________ 
This thesis meets the standards for appearance, conforms to the style and format 
requirements of the Graduate School of the University of North Dakota, and is hereby 
approved. 
_______________________________________________ 
            Dean of the Graduate School 
_______________________________________________ 
                                   Date 
iii 
PERMISSION 
Title Persuasion and Manipulation:  Relevance across Multiple Audiences 
Department Linguistics  
Degree Master of Arts 
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a graduate degree 
from the University of North Dakota, I agree that the library of this University shall make it 
freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for extensive copying for 
scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor who supervised my thesis work or, in 
his absence, by the chairperson of the department or the dean of the Graduate School. It is 
understood that any copying or publication or other use of this thesis or part thereof for 
financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. It is also understood that 
due recognition shall be given to me and to the University of North Dakota in any scholarly 
use which may be made of any material in my thesis. 
  Signature       ________________________________________ 
  Date        ________________________________________ 
iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF FIGURES ……………………………………………………………………………………………… vi 
LIST OF TABLES ……………………………………………………………………………………………….. vii 
ABBREVIATIONS ……………………………………………………………………………………………… viii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS …………………………………………………………………………………… ix 
ABSTRACT ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. x 
CHAPTER      
  1.   INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………………………………… 1 
  2. OVERVIEW OF THE CASE STUDY ……………………………………………………... 3 
   2.1 Setting of the Financial Crisis …………………………………………………….. 3 
   2.2 Setting of the Hearing ………………………………………………………………... 7 
  3.  RELEVANCE THEORY ………………………………………………………………………. 11 
   3.1 Speaker Meaning ……………………………………………………………………….. 11 
   3.2 The Principle of Relevance …………………………………………………………. 13 
   3.3 Relevance ………………………………………………………………………………….. 18 
   3.4 Cognitive Environments …………………………………………………………….. 22 
  4. COMMUNICATION ACROSS MULTIPLE AUDIENCES …………………………. 27 
   4.1 Implications of the Mutual Cognitive Environment ……………………… 27 
   4.2 Scalar Ostension and the Idealized Target Audience ……………………. 31 
   4.3 Epistemic Vigilance ……………………………………………………………………. 40 
   4.4 Informing ………………………………………………………………………………….. 46 
   4.4.1 The Intention …………………………………………………………………. 49 
   4.4.2 The Plan ………………………………………………………………………… 49 
v 
   4.4.3 The Stimulus Offered ……………………………………………………… 50 
   4.4.4 The Stimulus Perceived ………………………………………………….. 50 
   4.4.5 Processing for Ostension ………………………………………………... 51 
   4.4.6 Processing for Understanding ………………………………………… 52 
   4.4.7 Processing for Acceptance ……………………………………………… 52 
   4.4.8 Processing for Additional Relevance ………………………………. 52 
   4.5 Persuading ………………………………………………………………………………... 52 
   4.6 Manipulating …………………………………………………………………………….. 57 
  5.  LEXICAL CHOICES:  WAS IT A BAILOUT? ……………………………………….… 61 
  6.  CONCLUSIONS ……………………………………………………………………….……….. 71 
REFERENCES …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 74 
vi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure                     Page 
1. Closing Price of the DJIA (Feb 11, 2008 – Feb 11, 2009) ………………….………………. 6 
2. A Diagram of the Major Participants and Audiences ………………………………………... 8 
3. Utterance Interpretation ……………………………………………………………………………….. 18 
4. Mutual Cognitive Environment ………………………………………………….…………………... 23 
 
5. Continuum of Cases of Ostension …………………………………………………………………… 32 
 
6. Scalar Ostension ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 33 
 
7. Epistemic Vigilance and Processing Cost ………………………………………………………… 42 
 
8. Information Transmission (Code Model) ………………………………………………………... 46 
 
9. Relevance Theory Communication Process …………………………………………………….. 48 
 
10. Distinction between Informing and Persuading ……………………………………………… 53 
 
11. Bailout vs. Investment …………………………………………………………………………………... 66 
vii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page       
1.   List of 8 Banks that Participated in the Hearing .…………………………………………….. 5 
2.   Speaker’s Intentions ……………………………………………………………………………………... 39 
3.   Rep. Cleaver’s Utterance to Multiple Audiences ……………………………………………... 56 
4.   Bailout Terminology ……………………………………………………………………………………... 63 
5.   Investment Terminology ………………………………………………………………………………. 64 






AIG American International Group 
CEO  Chief Executive Officer 
CPP Capital Purchase Program 
DJIA Dow Jones Industrial Average 
P,Q Individual Assumptions 
Rep. Representative 
TARP Troubled Asset Relief Program 
U Utterance 
US United States of America 
ix 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I want to thank all of the members of my Committee for their insights and support.  
First, I am grateful to David Weber for first introducing me to Relevance Theory and for 
providing valuable editorial comments on my rough draft.  Next, I want to thank Kyle 
Conway for joining my Committee from the Communications Department; he has helped me 
to make the thesis accessible to audiences beyond those with a detailed knowledge of 
Relevance Theory.  Finally and most importantly, I want to thank Regina Blass, my 
Committee Chairperson, for providing valuable feedback and encouragement throughout 
my writing process.  I truly appreciate all of my Committee Members’ support. 
In addition, I want to thank all of my colleagues from the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, 







A speaker who is addressing multiple audiences has split intentions.   In order to derive 
the optimal benefit toward accomplishing her intentions, the speaker crafts her utterance to 
be relevant to her various audiences in different ways and to differing degrees.  Similarly, 
the hearer will infer meaning based largely on how much he thinks that the speaker 
intended her utterance to be relevant to him, while also considering how the utterance may 
have been intended to be relevant to others.  The goal of this paper is to describe how the 
presence of multiple audiences affects both the speaker’s formation of an utterance and the 
hearer’s interpretation of it.  I particularly focus on utterances that are aimed at persuading 
or manipulating the speaker’s various audiences.  Using the framework of Relevance Theory 
(Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1995), I analyze a hearing in which eight bank CEOs testified 
before the US House Committee on Financial Services regarding how they used money that 
the government had invested in their banks in the midst of a severe financial crisis.  I show 
that when communicating to multiple audiences, the speaker’s utterance is frequently less 
than fully ostensified to his various audiences.  I conclude that Relevance Theory can be 
used to explain communicative stimuli that are less than fully ostensified by making a 
modification to the Relevance Theoretic notion of the presumption of optimal relevance to 




As technology continues to expand our available modes of communication, it has 
become easier and easier to communicate to multiple indeterminate audiences at the same 
time.  In literary criticism, the notion of reader response has emphasized the fact that each 
reader can infer a different meaning from a single text.  In a similar manner, a speaker can 
actually intend to mean different things to different people through a single utterance.  The 
present study focuses on the properties of communicative utterances intended to be made 
manifest to multiple audiences.  Specifically, I will analyze a hearing (the Hearing) in which 
eight Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of financial institutions testified before the Committee 
of Financial Services of the US House of Representatives on February 11, 2009.  Given the 
tendency of those involved in a political discourse to advocate for their own positions, the 
Hearing provides excellent examples of how speakers attempt to persuade or manipulate 
others simultaneously across multiple audiences.  While the analysis of this particular 
hearing is interesting in its own right, it also serves as a useful tool to test the theoretical 
claims that I will make about how communication works across multiple audiences. 
To begin, I will provide the context of the hearing that serves as the primary source of 
examples.  Then, I will lay out the framework by which I will analyze persuasion and 
manipulation.  While the primary framework for my analysis is Relevance Theory (Sperber 
and Wilson 1986,1995), I will make several unique elaborations and applications of 
Relevance Theory with reference to persuasion, manipulation, and communication across 
multiple audiences.  I will also draw on recent research surrounding epistemic vigilance 
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(Sperber et al. 2010), which concerns how people choose to accept or reject information 
that is communicated to them.   
In addition, I will illustrate that neither persuasion nor manipulation constitutes a 
linguistically separate type of communication.  Rather, the extent that information differs 
from persuasion or manipulation is based on non-linguistic features such as trust and 
honesty.   
I will close with an extended example of how the presence of multiple audiences 
impacts the lexical choices of the speakers to the point that a speaker can intend a single 
word to have different meanings for different audiences.   
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Chapter 2 
OVERVIEW OF THE CASE STUDY 
2.1 Setting of the Financial Crisis 
In banking, reputation is supreme.  If a bank loses its reputation, its depositors and 
creditors will lose confidence in the bank’s ability to meet its obligations, causing it to 
become illiquid (unable to meet its short-term obligations) and, therefore, to fail.   When a 
bank fails, the bank’s shareholders will be the first people to lose all of their financial 
interest in the bank.  Essentially, the shares (fractional ownership) of a failed bank are 
worthless; that is, there is no benefit in owning part of a bank that is not worth anything 
even when taken as a whole.  If a bank is in danger of failing, there are multiple options that 
could be pursued:  (1) a more healthy bank could acquire the failing bank, thus causing no 
loss to depositors and creditors but a substantial—if not complete—loss to the 
shareholders; (2) the government or another private lender could provide emergency loans 
to the troubled bank; or (3) the bank could declare bankruptcy, which will typically result in 
a complete loss to shareholders, a substantial loss to creditors (entities to whom the bank 
owes money), and perhaps a loss to depositors whose accounts exceed the face value of any 
insurance on the deposits.   
Another important characteristic of the banking industry is that companies are inter-
related.  Banks lend money to each other and participate in other related transactions that 
are dependent on each entity fulfilling its own part of the deal.  Thus, the failure of a large 
bank could be so detrimental that it could cause other banks to fail as well because the large 
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bank would be unable to fulfill its obligations to the other banks.  This is known as systemic 
risk (risk to the entire financial system that is inherent to the nature of how the banks are 
interrelated) and is illustrated well by the image of a domino effect, in which the falling of 
the first domino causes many others dominos to fall as well.  The notion of systemic risk is 
also illustrated by the phrase “too big to fail.”  According to the too-big-to-fail philosophy, 
the government knows that the failure of very large financial institutions would cause a 
domino effect throughout the financial system, thus crippling the economy.  As a result—so 
the theory goes—the government will not allow banks to fail if it believes that the bank’s 
failure would be crippling to the overall economy; rather, the government will either rescue 
the potentially failing bank by providing it with loans, equity, or by forcing it to be acquired 
by a healthier bank.   
In September 2008, there was a severe disruption in the US financial markets.  This 
disruption was marked by the failure of multiple large banks and by the federal government 
coming to the rescue of some specific institutions but also to the entire financial system as a 
whole.  Without going into too many details, one way in which the government tried to 
stabilize the financial system was by purchasing $205 billion in preferred stock in various 
financial institutions.  This government initiative was known as the Capital Purchase 
Program (CPP), which was part of the broader Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).  Of 
the $205 billion in federal funds disbursed under the CPP, $165 billion (80.5%) were 
disbursed to the eight institutions who participated in the first round of funding.1
                                                             
1 Technically, there were nine institutions that received funds in the first round of funding.  However, 
by the time of the Hearing, two of the banks had merged:  Bank of America had acquired Merrill 
Lynch.  Because the merger was agreed upon prior to the receipt of CPP funds, I have included the 
funds received by Merrill Lynch in the total of funds received by Bank of America.  See 
  The US 
Secretary of the Treasury encouraged these eight institutions to participate in this program 
Table 1, Page 
5.  
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whether or not they thought they needed the money in a desire to strengthen the whole 
financial system. 
Table 1.  List of 8 Banks that Participated in the Hearing 
Bank Name  CEO Name 
CPP funds received    
($ billion) 
Goldman Sachs Lloyd Blankfein 10 
JP Morgan Chase James Dimon 25 
Bank of New York Mellon Robert Kelly 3 
Bank of America Ken Lewis 45 
State Street Corp. Ronald Logue 2 
Morgan Stanley John Mack 10 
Citigroup Vikram Pandit 45 
Wells Fargo John Stumpf 25 
Subtotal (8 banks from the Hearing) 165 
Plus:  Total funds to other banks2 40  
Total CPP funds: 205 
First 8 banks as a % of total CPP funds 80.50% 
In essence, the government became a shareholder of financial institutions on behalf of the 
US taxpayers.  By investing directly in the banks, the government hoped to minimize public 
fear that various banks would fail while also providing the banks with additional funds that, 
in theory, they would then lend to the public.  As a result of the financial crisis, it had 
become increasingly difficult for individuals and companies to obtain credit.  Investing 
money in the banks was one way that the government hoped to meet the public’s needs for 
credit. 
The financial crisis affected the general public as well.  As a frame of reference, the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), which is used as a barometer to measure the value of the 
US stock market, decreased drastically during the financial crisis.  During the one-year 
                                                             
 
2 Total funds to other banks exclude funds provided to American International Group (AIG).   
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period illustrated in Figure 1 below,  the DJIA’s closing price ranged from a high of $13,058 
on May 2, 2008 to a low of $7,552 on November 20, 2008, which is a decline of 42%.  
Figure 1.  Closing Price of the DJIA (Feb 11, 2008 – Feb 11, 2009)   
 
The rapid decline in stock prices drastically reduced or erased the savings of millions of US 
citizens, not to mention pension funds and other investors.  In addition to the drastic 
reduction in personal wealth, US businesses and citizens had a very difficult time in 
obtaining credit to finance their business operations, home or automobile purchases, 
education expenses, etc.   
While the Representatives and the CEOs were communicating directly with each other 
during the Hearing, they also had indirect audiences that they were trying to please.  To 
begin, the members of the US House of Representatives are elected by the voters in the 
areas that they represent.  Consequently, the Representatives have a high level of 
motivation to please their constituents, who have the power to vote them out of office 










A key indirect audience of the bank CEOs includes all individuals who invest in the 
stock market, including those who own shares in various financial institutions.  The 
shareholders of a company are the ones who own the company.  They vote to elect a 
company’s Board of Directors, which in turn hires and fires management and sets the 
management’s compensation.  Shareholders expect to earn returns on their investment in a 
company.  If a company is not doing well, shareholders will sell their stock to avoid losses or 
seek better gains.  The CEO of a company, therefore, has as a primary obligation to 
maximize the value created for the shareholders.  If a CEO fails his shareholders, he will 
likely be fired.  Not only so, but also a CEO’s compensation is typically linked somehow to 
the stock price of the company.   Indeed, the CEO often receives much of his compensation 
in stock or stock options, thus linking the CEO’s personal wealth to the price of the 
company’s stock.  Consequently, a CEO has a high motivation to please his shareholders.  
2.2 Setting of the Hearing 
At the request of the House Committee on Financial Services (House Committee), the 
CEOs of the first eight financial institutions to receive CPP funds testified before the House 
Committee on February 11, 2009.   They appeared before the House Committee to testify 
about how they used the money that the government had invested in their respective 
institutions.   
Given that my goal is to analyze how communication works across multiple audiences, 
some key factors to consider are (1) who are the audiences and (2) what are their goals.  
Given the many potential audiences and goals, the present study will focus on four key 
groups and one of their conflicting goals.  The four groups include the two groups of 
interlocutors, the Representatives and the eight bank CEOs, and two of the indirect 
audiences, the constituents of the Representatives and the shareholders of the eight banks 
(See Figure 2 below).   
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Figure 2.  A Diagram of the Major Participants and Audiences 
 
The direct communicators in the hearing are members of the House Committee 
(“Representatives”) and the eight bank CEOs.  At the time of the Hearing, 61 members of the 
House Committee were present:  39 Democrats and 22 Republicans.3  Although the 
Representatives have some interest in the stated purpose of the meeting, they are much 
more interested in appealing to their constituents.  A continual dilemma for a democratic 
republic like the United States is the quest of those who are elected to be re-elected.  Thus, 
regardless of whom they are addressing, a chief goal of the Representatives is to please 
their constituents.4
                                                             
3 Democrats and Republicans are the two dominant political parties in the US.   
  Henry Paulson, the Secretary of the US Treasury during the onset of the 
financial crisis, described the futility of congressional hearings as follows:  “I considered 
congressional hearings to be a waste of time.  I’d never seen any piece of legislation get done 
4 Granted, I am painting a broad stereotype that does not hold true for each Representative in each 
conversation.  However, to a large extent, the desire to please constituents is a major constraint on 
their communicative choices. 
US Congress
               House of Representatives                     Senate
   Committee on 
Financial Services
Blankfein         Dimon             Kelly              Lewis             Logue             Mack             Pandit           Stumpf
   Goldman       JP Morgan          BNY             Bank of        State Street        Morgan          Citigroup      Wells Fargo
      Sachs             Chase             Mellon           America            Bank              Stanley                              
8 Bank CEOs
                             Shareholders                                                                                                                                        Constituents
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there, never saw any compromise get worked out at a hearing.  I only saw politicians 
making statements meant to be seen back home” (Paulson 2011:149-150).  After a specific 
hearing, Paulson credited the politicians’ comments as causing a 26-27% decline in the 
stock prices of two companies that were the subjects of the hearing (2011:151).    Contrary 
to the inefficiency of public hearings, Paulson often found that he was able to accomplish a 
lot in private meetings with members of Congress. 
Whereas the Representatives want to please their constituents, the CEOs desire to 
please their shareholders.  They are careful guardians of their institutions’ reputation.  They 
desire to portray their institutions as financially strong, their leadership as competent, and 
their conduct as ethical.  A material disclosure of weakness could ruin an institution’s 
reputation and possibly cause it to fail.  At the very least, a failure to protect the 
shareholders’ interests would cause the institution’s stock price to decline, thus reducing 
shareholder value.   
While the CEOs and Representatives have a myriad of differing goals, I will focus 
specifically on their respective goals to control public opinion regarding the nature of the 
government’s Capital Purchase Program (CPP).  On the one side, the Representatives tend 
to portray the CPP as a bailout:  The government came to the rescue of financially 
irresponsible and greedy bankers for the dutiful protection of citizens on whose behalf the 
Representatives are faithfully serving.   On the other side, the bankers sidestep any notion of 
wrongdoing or weakness, portraying their institutions as financially strong and ethically 
responsible.  Rather than being bailed out by the government, the CEOs cooperated with the 
government to protect the interests of the American people.   
What is at stake is public opinion, which affects both how people vote and how people 
invest.  Given the differing goals of the interlocutors, this hearing provides an excellent 
opportunity to examine the nature of persuasion and manipulation.  Since manipulation and 
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persuasion are more nuanced and precise types of communication, however, it is first 
necessary to place these types of communication within a broader communicative 




3.1 Speaker Meaning 
In language use, at least two parties are involved:  a speaker and a hearer.  Even in the 
case of talking to oneself or writing a personal diary for one’s own private use (or even 
consciously processing internal thoughts), there is still both a speaker and her audience, 
albeit that these two roles are filled by the same person.  Given that an utterance has both a 
speaker and a hearer, the understanding of the utterance must be examined both from the 
speaker’s and the hearer’s perspectives.   
Stereotypical cases of informing include showing someone something (direct evidence) 
and telling someone something (indirect evidence).  If a speaker wants to inform a hearer 
that his favorite drinking glass has been broken, she can either show him the broken pieces 
of his drinking glass or state (1). 
1. “Your favorite drinking glass has been broken.”   
The hearer’s understanding that his favorite glass has been broken is dependent on his 
ability either to recognize the broken pieces of glass (direct evidence) or to trust the 
speaker’s competence and honesty in uttering (1), “Your favorite drinking glass has been 
broken” (indirect evidence).  In the case of the indirect evidence, we might say that the 
speaker meant for the following to happen as a result of her utterance: 
2. The hearer holds the following assumption as true:  “My favorite drinking glass 
has been broken.”   
Another way to describe what the speaker meant in the utterance (1) is as follows: 
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3.    (a)  The speaker intended her utterance (1) to produce a response (2). 
(b)  The speaker intended for the hearer to recognize her intention (3a). 
(c)  The hearer’s recognition of the speaker’s intention (3b) served as at least 
part of the reason for the hearer’s response (2). 
The formulation of (3a-c) above follows along the lines of Grice’s definition of speaker 
meaning:  “Perhaps we may sum up what is necessary for A to mean something by x as 
follows.  A must intend to induce by x a belief in an audience, and he must also intend his 
utterance to be recognized as so intended” (1957:383; see also Strawson 2002:120).   
Sperber and Wilson further refine Grice’s notion of speaker meaning by describing the 
speaker’s intentions as follows (1995:29): 
4.    (a)  Informative intention:  to inform the audience of something 
(b)  Communicative intention:  to inform the audience of one’s informative   
intention.   
In their model, the informative intention (4a) is similar to the Gricean model in (3a), while 
the communicative intention (4b) resembles (3b).  Sperber and Wilson purposefully 
exclude the equivalent of (3c) from being part of speaker meaning because (3c) is 
dependent on (3a) actually happening.  If the hearer fails to believe that his favorite glass 
has been broken, despite the utterance of the speaker, then the informative intention will 
have gone unfulfilled.   Thus, contrary to Grice’s notion of meaning, what the speaker 
actually means by an utterance is independent of the consequences of her utterance.   
In the case of the broken drinking glass, let us suppose that, at the time of the speaker’s 
utterance, the hearer was distracted by some other thought and did not understand what 
the speaker was trying to tell him.  In this case, both the communicative intention and the 
informative intention will have gone unfulfilled.  The communicative intention will be 
fulfilled only to the extent that a hearer understands a speaker’s meaning.  The informative 
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intention, on the other hand, will be fulfilled to the extent that the hearer accepts the 
speaker’s meaning and adopts the relevant assumptions into his own view of the world. 
Again, the actual fulfillment of the speaker’s intentions is independent of her meaning.  
The very fact that a speaker’s intentions can go unfulfilled is enough to show that human 
communication is more than just the encoding and decoding of information.  Words are not 
codes for static representations of ideas; after all, each individual has different mental 
associations with words, and the meaning of a word can change in different contexts 
(Carston 2002, Moreno 2007, Wilson 2003, Wilson and Carston 2007).  Although human 
communication often results in misunderstandings, people must experience a great deal of 
success at it, or they would have abandoned it (Sperber 2001).  As Sperber and Wilson note, 
“Failures in communication are to be expected:  what is mysterious and requires 
explanation is not failure but success” (1995:45).  The key heuristic to understanding 
human communication is the principle of relevance. 
3.2 The Principle of Relevance 
People communicate at a risk.  For example, the speaker risks being misunderstood, 
while the hearer risks misunderstanding what the speaker uttered.  Not only are there risks 
in communication, but there are also costs.  The speaker exerts effort in formulating and 
delivering her utterance, and the hearer exerts effort in receiving and processing the 
utterance.  Those who make investments with inherent risks do so in the hope of a possible 
or expected benefit.  In the sphere of communication, the expected benefits include the 
following:  “For the addressee, the normally expected benefit is to acquire some true and 
relevant information.  For the communicator, it is to produce some intended effect in the 
addressee” (Sperber et al. 2010:360).  These costs and benefits are coordinated by the same 
underlying principle:  the principle of relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1995).   
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Sperber and Wilson have proposed two complementary principles of relevance:  one 
cognitive and the other communicative.  According to the cognitive principle of relevance, 
human cognition is naturally wired to maximize the amount of relevant information to an 
individual.  People adjust their attention to various stimuli based on their perceived notion 
of benefit from these stimuli.  When processing a specific utterance, the hearer processes 
the utterance efficiently, following the Relevance Theoretic comprehension procedure 
(Wilson and Sperber 2004:613): 
5.    (a)  Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects:  Test interpretive  
hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc.) in 
order of accessibility.  
(b)  Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied.  
The cognitive principle of relevance contrasts with theories of communication that posit 
that a hearer first entertains a literal meaning before entertaining a figurative meaning.  
Instead, the cognitive principle of relevance posits that a hearer naturally chooses the 
interpretation that satisfies his expectation of relevance.  For example, consider the 
following exchange between Rep. Grayson and Citigroup CEO Vikram Pandit (Hearing:95)5
6.   (a)  Rep. Grayson:  Have you heard the phrase, Mr. Pandit, “Heads, I win; tails,  
: 
you lose?” 
(b)  Mr. Pandit:  I appreciate that, Congressman.  I don’t think it applies here. 
In his remarks, Rep. Grayson accused Citigroup of trying to cheat the US government—and 
therefore the US taxpayers—by entering into an arrangement whereby Citigroup would be 
assured a benefit while the US government would be assured a loss.  While Rep. Grayson 
phrased his accusation as a question—likely so that he could deny making an accusation if 
                                                             
5 For direct quotations from the transcript of the Hearing, I will simply list Hearing and the page 
number in the in-text citation.  The full citation is in the Reference section. 
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so accused, Mr. Pandit successfully interpreted the utterance as an accusation.  Rather than 
answering his question, Mr. Pandit denied the accusation, saying, “I don’t think it applies 
here” (6b).  According to the cognitive principle of relevance, Mr. Pandit did not have to 
reject the literal interpretation of this utterance’s propositional form (a question) before 
assigning a different illocutionary force to the utterance.  Mr. Pandit had no reason to 
believe that a literal answer to Rep. Grayson’s question (whether or not he had ever heard 
of a certain phrase) would have been relevant to either the inquirer or any other indirect 
audience.  On the other hand, the interpretation as an accusation would have been both 
immediately accessible and relevant to everyone.  Therefore, Mr. Pandit understood Rep. 
Grayson’s utterance as an accusation without first entertaining and dismissing a literal 
interpretation.   
The cognitive principle of relevance forms the basis for a second, or communicative, 
principle of relevance, which states that every act of ostensive communication 
communicates (1) that it is worth the hearer’s processing effort and (2) that it is designed 
to achieve the optimal amount of relevance for the hearer (net effect of processing costs and 
cognitive benefits), constrained by the speaker’s own abilities and preferences.  At first, this 
might sound as though the speaker is expected to act to her own disadvantage in order to 
accommodate the hearer, but it actually says that the speaker will act in her own best 
interests.  As stated earlier, the speaker’s communicative motivation is to produce an 
intended effect in her audience.  Therefore, the speaker is motivated to produce a stimulus 
that will most effectively and efficiently enable the hearer to infer her intended meaning.  If 
her utterance is too difficult to process, then the hearer will abandon his processing of it as 
soon as he believes that it is no longer worth his effort.  Of course, a speaker invests only as 
much effort into formulating an utterance as she expects her efforts to help her achieve her 
own goals.  Similarly, a hearer does not expect a speaker to utter something that runs 
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contrary to her own goals, abilities, or preferences.  The communicative principle of 
relevance is motivated by the fact that both the speaker and the hearer are presumed to be 
pursuing their own best interests.  
However, in order for a speaker to presume that her ostensive act of communication 
will be worth the hearer’s attention and processing effort, she must have a reasonable 
expectation of what would be relevant to the hearer.  Not only so, she must also have a 
reasonable expectation of how to produce a stimulus that would allow the hearer to recover 
a representation of the thought that she was trying to communicate.   In other words, the 
communicators must have the ability to generate metarepresentations, (representations of 
other representations).   For example, an intention is a representation of a desirable state of 
affairs.  To attribute an intention to someone else is to metarepresent because it involves 
forming a representation in one’s own mind of a representation in someone else’s mind.  
According to Sperber (1994:187), attributing intentions to others is a defining aspect of (at 
least adult) human communication:  
Very few animals have any meta-representational ability.  There is some 
experimental and anecdotal evidence suggesting that chimpanzees and possibly 
other non-human primates do possess some such ability in a rudimentary form.  
What about humans?  Do they have a meta-representational ability?  Do birds fly?  
Do fish swim?  Humans can no more refrain from attributing intentions than they 
can from batting their eyelids.  The only issue regarding humans is developmental:  
at which age and through what stages do meta-representational abilities develop, if 
they are not there from the start? 
These claims presume that communication is mainly an inferential process, whereby the 
utterance is merely a clue of the speaker’s intended meaning.  Just as the speaker has to 
make assumptions about how her stimulus will be relevant to her audience, so the hearer 
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has to make assumptions about how the speaker intended her utterance to be relevant.  The 
ability to metarepresent enables human communication to be so efficient. 
Continuing on the topic of metarepresentation, consider the following excerpt from 
Rep. Capuano’s comments to the CEOs (Hearing:57): 
7. Rep. Capuano (to all the CEOs):  I cannot believe that no one has prosecuted you 
[for how your banks’ complex legal structures allowed you to incur excessive 
risk]....my hope is that you will be answering those questions in court some day. 
It would be hard for any adult to read Rep. Capuano’s comments without attributing certain 
intentions to him, for example, that he intends the CEOs to know that he thinks their 
behavior was criminal (an informative intention).  Even the propositional form of Rep. 
Capuano’s utterance is itself a representation of a thought in his own mind.  The utterance 
does not fully convey his thought but is merely an interpretation or representation of it.  
(For more on this, see the Underdeterminacy Thesis in Carston 2002, Moreno 2007.)  The 
chart in Figure 3 (below) (adapted from Sperber and Wilson 1995:232; see also Carston 
2002:331) maps how an utterance can be interpreted.  In the right margin, I have included 
the mapping of the utterance from Example (7) for comparison. 
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Figure 3:  Utterance Interpretation 
 
In review of Figure 3 and Example (7), the hearer uses the speaker’s utterance as 
evidence from which he infers what she intended.   
In summary, the communicative principle of relevance posits that every ostensive 
utterance communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance.  This implicit 
presumption allows the hearer to interpret the stimulus with an expectation that the 
speaker is trying to be relevant. 
3.3 Relevance 
So far I have argued along the tenets of Relevance Theory that people desire to obtain 
relevance.  But what is relevance?  In general terms, people’s pursuit of relevance is their 
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pursuit to improve their understanding of the world.  Since the notion of improving 
something is a comparative notion, it follows that some stimuli will be more relevant than 
others.  It also follows that some things can cause relevance to increase while others cause 
relevance to decrease.   
The main item that decreases the relevance of an utterance is the processing effort 
required to interpret the utterance, which is dependent on factors such as the accessibility 
of a given context or the processing abilities of the individual.  While the cost of relevance is 
measured in processing effort, the benefits are measured in cognitive effects.  Cognitive 
effects generally fall into one of the following three categories:  (1) contextual implications, 
(2) contradictions of previous assumptions, or (3) the strengthening an existing 
assumption.  All three types of cognitive effects are demonstrated clearly in the following 
dialogue between the Bank of America CEO Ken Lewis and Rep. Foster.  Prior to Mr. Lewis’ 
initial comment below, Rep. Foster had asked the eight CEOs about the worst-case planning 
scenarios that they had entertained prior to the height of the financial crisis (Hearing:90).   
8.  (a)  Mr. Lewis:  We had [adequately prepared for a] 30 percent decline in real  
estate prices about a year ago. 
(b)  Rep. Foster:  “So you saw this [financial crisis] coming and were relatively 
quiet about it for quite a while.” 
(c)  Mr. Lewis:  “No.” 
(d)  Rep. Foster:  “You gamed out a survival strategy.” 
(e)  Mr. Lewis:  “Right.” 
(f)  Rep. Foster:  “That is different.” 
Let us see how each of Mr. Lewis’ comments achieved relevance for Rep. Foster.  Mr. Lewis’ 
utterance in Example (8a) achieved relevance by combining with other assumptions of Rep. 
Grayson to yield contextual implications.  In this case, Mr. Lewis’ statement about his 
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company’s worst-case scanning scenario served as an input for the contextual implication 
that Rep. Foster then stated in Example (8b).  The process by which Rep. Foster derived the 
contextual implication (8b) may have gone like this: 
9.  (a)   Assumption (implicated premise):  If one plans for a certain scenario, then  
he must have a reasonable expectation that the scenario will happen.  (If P1, 
then Q1)  
(b)  Assumption (from Example (8a)):  Mr. Lewis planned for a crisis scenario a 
year in advance.  (P1, therefore Q1:  Mr. Lewis had a reasonable expectation 
that the financial crisis would happen.) 
(c)  Assumption (implicated premise):  If Mr. Lewis had a reasonable 
expectation that the financial crisis would happen a year in advance and did 
not do anything to warn the rest of the economy, he is at least partly to 
blame for the financial crisis.  (If Q1  and P2, then Q2.) 
(d)  Assumption (8b):  Mr. Lewis did not do anything to warn the rest of the 
economy.  (P2) 
(e)  Contextual implication from Example (8b):  Mr. Lewis is at least partly to 
blame for the financial crisis.  (Q1 and P2, therefore Q2) 
To achieve relevance by means of contextual implication (as illustrated above), the 
processing of the utterance must combine with other assumptions to yield implications that 
were worth the hearer’s processing effort to derive and that were not available without the 
premises derived from the utterance.  For instance, in the Example (8) above, Rep. Foster 
could not have derived (8b) unless Mr. Lewis had uttered (8a). 
Another type of relevance that would improve one’s understanding of the world is to 
have a previously held assumption contradicted.  This type of cognitive effect is illustrated 
by Mr. Lewis’ response, “No,” in (8c).  By stating, “No,” Mr. Lewis contradicted Rep. Foster’s 
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implicated premise (8b/9e).  By simply uttering “No,” Mr. Lewis did not make explicit how 
he was contradicting Rep. Foster’s implicated premise.  He could have been contradicting 
one or both of Rep. Foster’s assumptions as in the following (non-exhaustive, hypothetical 
list): 
10.  (a)  Contradicting (9c):  As a private citizen, I have no duty to protect the rest of  
         the country.  My duty is to my company, not the US people. 
(b)  Contradicting (9a):  Even though I planned for a worst-case scenario, I did 
not expect the worst-case scenario to come true.  By definition, my worst-
case scenario should be more pessimistic than my expected case. 
As it turns out, Rep. Foster understood Ken Lewis to mean something along the lines of 
(10b) rather than (10a).  This can be explained by Rep. Foster’s expectation of relevance.  
He would not expect for Ken Lewis purposefully to come across as arrogant and 
inconsiderate of the US people as in (10a); after all, the bankers were trying to portray 
themselves as morally responsible, thus shifting blame for the financial crisis off 
themselves.  One attitude that the bankers were trying to convey was expressed succinctly 
earlier in the hearing by the Wells Fargo CEO, John Stumpf (Hearing:20): 
11. John Stumpf:  “We are Americans first, and we are bankers second.” 
Thus, Rep. Foster was quickly able to infer which premise Mr. Lewis was questioning.  Rep. 
Foster even corrected his previous implication (8b/9e) by stating (8d), “You gamed out a 
survival strategy then.”  Mr. Lewis then responded (8e), “Right,” which provided relevance 
by strengthening Rep. Foster’s assumption that Mr. Lewis’ worst-case scenario was created 
in order to help his own company survive.  Without being explicitly refuted, Rep. Foster 
abandoned his prior implicature that Mr. Lewis behaved irresponsibly by not warning the 
general public. 
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Some utterances do not produce cognitive effects and, therefore, do not yield relevance 
to an individual (that is, do not improve his understanding of the world) (Sperber and 
Wilson 1995:120-121), or at least they do not yield relevance in the way that the speaker 
intended.  In order for an utterance to be relevant to an individual, the hearer must have 
access to a context from which he will be able to derive true contextual implications, to 
contradict previously held assumptions, or to strengthen previously held assumptions.  The 
communicative exchange between Rep. Foster and Mr. Lewis (8a-f) illustrates the 
importance of context in interpreting an utterance.  Contextual factors about their 
knowledge, their goals, and their expectations helps one understand the meaning behind 
their utterances.  In order to provide a more precise description of the communicative 
process, it is now necessary for me to refine how contextual factors influence utterance 
interpretation. 
3.4 Cognitive Environments 
The notion of context tends to refer to a wide variety of factors that contribute to the 
way that an utterance is understood.  I will employ some more precise terms from 
Relevance Theory to specify the context for each participant in a communicative exchange.  
To begin, an individual’s cognitive environment consists of all the assumptions that are 
manifest to him at a given moment.  To be manifest in a given moment, an assumption 
either needs to be perceivable from one’s environment or inferable based on the 
assumptions of the individual (Sperber and Wilson 1995:38-46).   
Each person has a unique cognitive environment that is dependent both on physical 
and cognitive factors.  Regarding the physical environment, the things that someone can 
hear, smell, see, taste, and feel all affect the assumptions that are manifest to him; the 
factors of one’s physical environment are—or would be if noticed—processed through the 
individual’s cognitive system.  The purely cognitive factors that affect one’s cognitive 
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environment include his logical and encyclopaedic entries.  A logical entry provides rules or 
instructions on how to process information.  Examples of logical entries include deductive 
rules such as “If P, then Q” or the logical meaning of the word and.   Encyclopaedic entries, 
on the other hand, store information about properties of things, memories, and other items 
that describe a conceptual representation rather than a strictly logical form.  When 
processing thoughts, one typically combines encyclopaedic and logical entries to form full 
thoughts.   
Two people can have similar items manifest to them at the same time.  For instance, 
two people in the same room have access to a lot of the same physical observations about 
the room; their environments are not entirely equal, however, because that they occupy 
different spaces within the room and have different perceptual abilities.  Likewise, each 
person has different experiences, different associations with words, and different cognitive 
abilities.  Thus, there are certain parts of a speaker’s cognitive environment that she shares 
with her audience, while there are other parts that are different.  Consider Figure 4 below: 
Figure 4.  Mutual Cognitive Environment 
 
In a conversation between Rep. Posey and Bank of America CEO Ken Lewis, the square 
represents the cognitive environment of Rep. Posey and the circle that of the Mr. Lewis.   
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The shaded area of overlap between these two environments represents their mutual 
cognitive environment.   The mutual cognitive environment represents the assumptions 
that are manifest to both the Representative and the CEO; these assumptions are considered 
to be mutually manifest.   
When Rep. Posey addresses an utterance toward Mr. Lewis, for instance, it is mutually 
manifest that Rep. Posey is making claims on Mr. Lewis’ attention, thereby presuming that 
his utterance will yield contextual effects that will be worth Mr. Lewis’ attention to process.  
Mr. Lewis, then, is justified in having expectations of relevance.  First let us consider an 
actual conversation from the Hearing (73): 
12.  (a)  Rep. Posey:  “Mr. Lewis, you are Mr. Countrywide, Mr. Bank of America?” 
(b)  Mr. Lewis:  “No, I am not Mr. Countrywide.” 
As background information to Example (12), Rep. Posey’s utterance is a question because 
he was calling on Mr. Lewis to provide a second opinion to a question that he had just posed 
to Mr. Blankfein of Goldman Sachs.  (The specific question is not relevant to this example; it 
is simply relevant that Rep. Posey was not merely questioning Mr. Lewis’ name.)  As 
additional background information, Bank of America had acquired Countrywide, a bank that 
was in severe financial distress at the time that it was acquired.  Countrywide was notorious 
for having very poor lending standards, which was a big cause of the financial crisis.  Mr. 
Lewis had gone to great lengths to separate the reputation of Bank of America from that of 
the weaker banks that it had acquired, namely Countrywide and Merrill Lynch.  These 
background assumptions were highly accessible to both interlocutors.   
 Relevance Theory claims that mutually manifest assumptions guide the hearer in how to 
attribute intentions to the speaker.  While Rep. Posey’s statement surely produced a variety 
of contextual effects for Mr. Lewis, let us consider how Mr. Lewis could have deduced the 
contextual implication (13e):   
25 
13.  (a)  Mutual assumption:  I am the CEO of the company that acquired  
Countrywide.   (P1) 
(b)  Mutual assumption: Countrywide played a significant role in causing the  
current financial crisis.   (P2) 
 (c)  Implicated premise attributed by Mr. Lewis to Rep. Posey based on the 
utterance (12a):   If I am the CEO of the company that acquired 
Countrywide and if Countrywide played a significant role in causing the 
financial crisis, then I am responsible for playing a significant role in the 
financial crisis.  (If P1 and P2, then Q.) 
(d)  Contextual Implication:  I played a significant role in causing the financial 
crisis.  (P1 and P2, therefore Q) 
Without missing a beat, Mr. Lewis rejected the implicated premise (13c) and the contextual 
implication (13d) by stating (12b):  “No, I am not Mr. Countrywide.”   
Mr. Lewis’ ability to assign intentionality to Rep. Posey’s utterance illustrates that Mr. 
Lewis has the ability to construct a representation of what he thought that Rep. Posey was 
thinking.  Following Sperber (1994), I will place each successive layer of representation on 
a separate line.   
14. (a)  Rep. Posey intends 
(b)  me [Mr. Lewis] to know  
(c)  that he intends 
(d)  me to accept as true  
(e)  that he believes 
(f)  that I played a significant role in causing 
the financial crisis. 
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Let us work through each of the layers of these representations.  The first two layers (14a-
b) simply posit that Mr. Posey had a communicative intention:  He intended to communicate 
that he had an informative intention.  The next two layers (14c-d) constitute the 
informative intention:  He intended to inform Mr. Lewis of something.  The final 2 layers 
(14e-f) would typically include the representation of the thought that Rep. Posey wanted 
Mr. Lewis to believe.  However, Rep. Posey could not have reasonably expected for Mr. 
Lewis to accept a self-incriminating proposition such as (14f).  Therefore, both Rep. Posey 
and Mr. Lewis must attribute the belief in (14e-f) to someone else.  As I suggested in (14e), 
for Mr. Lewis to attribute this belief to Mr. Posey is at least one possibility; unless he were 
speaking deceitfully, it would generally be expected that he would accept as true the 
propositions of whose truth he was trying to inform others.  Given that he was not trying to 
inform Mr. Lewis of the proposition (14f), he may have been trying to inform some other 
audiences, such as the following: 
15.  (a)  Possible relevance of (14f) to Rep. Posey’s constituents:   
By placing blame on Mr. Lewis, Rep. Posey might be identifying with the 
opinion of his constituents, who had great anger toward the banking 
industry.  By finding someone else to blame, his constituents might be less 
likely to blame him.  
(b)  Possible relevance of (14f) to Rep. Posey’s fellow Representatives:   
He might be trying to convince his fellow Representatives that the banking 
industry deserves the distress that it is in.  Perhaps he desires to push a 
political agenda that is punitive to banks. 
At any rate, I have now laid the foundations of Relevance Theory sufficiently to explore 
more complicated issues such as communication across multiple audiences, persuasion, and 
manipulation.  These will be the main subjects of the next chapter.    
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Chapter 4 
COMMUNICATION ACROSS MULTIPLE AUDIENCES 
4.1 Implications of the Mutual Cognitive Environment 
The Hearing before the House Committee on Financial services was nationally 
televised.  The transcript and video of the Hearing are public records.  Even during the 
hours of the Hearing, the words of the CEOs and the Representatives impacted the stock 
prices of the banks.  On a more delayed note, the behavior of the politicians contributed to 
their reputation and, ultimately, to their ability to be re-elected.  While relatively few 
shareholders or constituents probably paid attention to the details of the Hearing, the 
movers and shakers of the stock market, the media, and the political engine digested the 
Hearing on their behalf.   
Because the Hearing was a matter of public discourse, the politicians and CEOs 
certainly spoke differently than they would have spoken if the Hearing had taken place in a 
confidential environment.  But why?  And how?  The answer to both of these questions rests 
in the Relevance Theoretic notion of the mutual cognitive environment.  If the Hearing had 
been confidential, one of the mutually manifest assumptions (to the CEOs and 
Representatives) would have been the very fact that the Hearing was confidential.  In such a 
confidential setting, the utterances could have been processed only by the CEOs and the 
Representatives themselves and not by the public at large.  As a result, the interlocutors 
would have strived to achieve relevance only for those who had access to their utterances.  
Under the actual scenario, however, in which it was mutually manifest that the Hearing was 
a matter of public discourse, the CEOs and the Representatives knew that the general public 
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would have immediate access to their utterances.  Thus, the interlocutors sought to achieve 
relevance not only with each other but also with the indirect audiences in whom they 
wanted to produce certain effects.   
  Granted, speakers do not strive to achieve relevance to each of the myriad possible 
audiences who might have access to their utterances.  Rather, speakers prioritize their 
efforts to achieve relevance according to their higher-level plans and intentions.  After all, 
the motivation of a speaker is to produce an intended effect in her audience.  Therefore, a 
speaker exerts only as much effort in formulating and delivering an utterance as she expects 
her effort to benefit her by producing intended effects in her audiences.  To the extent that a 
speaker’s intention to produce an effect in one audience is greater than her intention to 
produce an effect in a different audience, her higher-ranked intention will take priority over 
her lower-ranked intention.  In an ideal world, the speaker would love to accomplish both 
the higher- and lower-ranked intentions.  When these intentions are in conflict with each 
other, however, the speaker’s utterance can provide clues about which intention was 
primary.   
For instance, the following dialogue between Rep. King and Morgan Stanley’s CEO John 
Mack illustrates this point.  Before examining this example, however, we need some 
background information.  The banking industry is highly regulated.  That is, there are 
various government entities that set rules for banks that are under their supervision; these 
entities are called regulators.  The regulators examine the banks for compliance with their 
rules and also have the power to punish banks that are not in compliance.  A single bank 
could have numerous regulators, each overseeing compliance for a different area of risk 
within the bank.  The severity of the financial crisis exposed a major flaw in the fragmented 
regulatory framework:  No single regulator had a comprehensive view of a bank’s risk 
profile.  As a result, there was considerable discussion about the possibility of creating a 
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systemic risk regulator that would have a comprehensive view of a bank’s risk profile.  In 
light of this background information, now consider Example (16): 
16.  (a)  Rep. King:  If we establish this systemic risk regulator, which  existing 
regulators would this replace?   
(b)  Mr. Mack:  There needs to be, I believe, a coming together of regulatory 
oversight.  So that is at the first level.  And I think it is up to a number of 
hearings and discussions on how that takes place, but I would like to see a 
combination of some of our regulators. 
In (16a) Rep. King asks a very specific question about which regulatory agencies should be 
shut down if a new systemic risk regulator were established.  This presented a problem for 
Mr. Mack:  He likely wanted to answer the question completely and honestly, but he could 
not do so because he knew that the regulators would hear his answer.  This would be like 
asking an employee to state which of his supervisors should be fired while it was mutually 
manifest that the supervisors were listening to the employee’s answer.  If the employee 
says, “You should fire supervisors Smith, Jones, and Williams,” then the employee might face 
negative repercussions from any supervisors who were not fired.  Thus, the employee is 
likely to provide a sincere and complete answer only if he expects his reply to result in the 
immediate firing of the supervisors, thus avoiding any negative repercussions.   On a similar 
note, Mr. Mack knows that his opinion will not result in the immediate termination of any of 
his regulators.  After all, changes in government move very slowly because of all the 
bureaucracy.  Therefore, in his response in (16b), Mr. Mack affirms that some of the 
agencies should be replaced but he does not name any specific regulator for fear of 
retaliation.  However, if the Hearing had been confidential, Mr. Mack would likely have 
taken the opportunity to speak more openly about which regulators he considered to be 
unnecessary.   As a result, his vague response reveals that his desire to please his regulators 
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was greater than his desire to answer Rep. King’s question fully.  Furthermore, Mr. Mack’s 
desire to please his regulators is based in his desire to please his shareholders.  If pleasing 
the regulators is good for the company, then pleasing the regulators is good for the 
shareholders as well. 
Another implication of the existence of multiple mutual cognitive environments is that 
a speaker can use a single proposition to mean different things to different people.  In 
formulating her utterance, a speaker anticipates how the hearer will infer meaning from it.   
Thus, to the extent that she cares about the effects on each audience, she will consider how 
her utterance will be interpreted by each addressee based on what she considers to be the 
mutual cognitive environments of her addressees.   
In assessing how to be relevant to her target audiences, the speaker is aware of 
multiple ways in which her audiences’ cognitive environments differ: 
17.  (a)  Different physical environments:  Some assumptions are perceivable based  
on one’s surroundings and, therefore manifest to that individual.  No two 
people share the exact same physical environment.   
(b)  Different cognitive abilities:  People have different abilities to perceive and 
process information.   
(c)  Different assumptions:  In processing an utterance, the hearer uses his 
previously held assumptions to infer meaning.  When a new utterance is 
processed against previously held assumptions, four possibilities are (1) 
combining with assumptions to yield new contextual implications; (2) 
contradicting previously held assumptions; (3) strengthening previously 
held assumptions; or (4) having no direct effect on previously held 
assumptions because of a lack of a context where the utterance is relevant. 
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(d)  Different expectations of relevance:  Each hearer has expectations of how a 
speaker is trying to be relevant to him.  He processes an utterance to obtain 
the contextual effects that are most readily accessible to him, stopping 
when his expectations of relevance have been satisfied or when the cost of 
further processing outweighs the expected benefit. 
The speaker uses her assumptions about these differences in guiding her addressees’ 
interpretations of her utterance.  Sperber and Wilson’s analogy of dancing fits the situation 
(1995:43):   
Co-ordination problems are avoided, or considerably reduced, in dancing by leaving 
the responsibility to one partner who leads, while the other has merely to follow.  
We assume that the same goes for communication.  It is left to the communicator to 
make correct assumptions about the codes and contextual information that the 
audience will have accessible and be likely to use in the comprehension process. 
Indeed, communication is speaker-initiated.  As stated in the communicative principle of 
relevance, each ostensive act of communication comes with an implicit presumption of its 
optimal relevance.   
4.2 Scalar Ostension and the Idealized Target Audience 
The presumption of optimal relevance is applicable only to acts of ostensive 
communication.  When a speaker makes it obvious that she is trying to communicate with 
an addressee, she communicates that she intends for her utterance to be optimally relevant 
to the hearer.  When she does not make it obvious that she is communicating to a particular 
audience (hiding her communicative intention), her audience still might gain relevant 
information from the utterance.  However, because the speaker makes no claims on her 
audience’s attention, she also does not imply that her stimulus will be worth her audience’s 
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attention.  The non-ostensively communicated stimulus may very well be relevant to an 
audience, but it does not come with a presumption of its relevance to that audience.   
Thus far, I have spoken of communication as being either ostensive or non-ostensive.   
Ostensive communication carries a presumption of optimal relevance, while non-ostensive 
communication does not.  In their discussion of ostension, though, Sperber and Wilson note 
that there is a range of ostension that goes from “showing” (providing direct evidence) to 
“saying that” (providing indirect evidence).  Yet their mention of a “continuum of cases of 
ostension” requires more specific elaboration (1995:53).  Sperber and Wilson’s discussed 
the “continuum of cases of ostension” in relation to providing direct evidence (showing) 
versus indirect evidence (telling), both of which would still be ostensive communication.  In 
this interpretation, the “continuum of cases of ostension” has epistemological implications 
such as suggesting that an audience processes direct demonstrative evidence similarly to 
indirect testimony.  A model of this continuum might look like the following: 
  Figure 5.  Continuum of Cases of Ostension 
 
       
    
   
Yet there is another possible application of the idea of a continuum of cases of 
ostension.  For instance, a speaker could be more or less obvious as to how much she 
intends her stimulus to be relevant to a particular audience.  I will refer to this concept as 
scalar ostension.   By the term scalar, I am positing that there is not a clear dichotomy 
between ostensive and non-ostensive communication.  Rather, a particular stimulus will fall 






  Figure 6.  Scalar Ostension 
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The purpose of positing scalar ostension is to show that a speaker can vary the strength of 
her ostension to a particular audience, which will directly affect the degree to which she 
presumes that her stimulus will be relevant to her audience.  From the hearer’s perspective, 
the perceived strength of the ostension will impact his expectation of relevance, which will 
affect the amount of processing effort that he is willing to invest in pursuit of cognitive 
benefits.    
As a clarification, scalar ostension does not always provide a useful comparison.  In 
particular, as communication becomes more and more ostensive, the value in comparing 
the differences in ostension trends asymptotically toward zero.  The same is true on the 
other side of the ostension spectrum.  Comparison can also be difficult or unfruitful in cases 
in which multiple variables have changed.  However, in cases in which the level of ostension 
varies slightly, especially in ambiguous cases, there is much comparative value.  In 
particular, later on I will illustrate how scalar ostension helps to explain the communication 
from the Hearing.   
If my notion of scalar ostension is accurate, a revision of the communicative principle 
of relevance would be warranted as follows (my change to Sperber and Wilson 1995:260 is 
in italics):  “Every act of fully ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its 
own optimal relevance.”  This revision is not a contradiction of Sperber and Wilson’s 
Relevance Theory, whose domain was exclusively ostensive communication and for which 
this caveat would be superfluous.  Rather, it is an expansion of the application of Relevance 
Theory to communicative domains that, while still being ostensive, may not be fully 
ostensive.  I will make my revision to the communicative principle of relevance even more 
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explicit:  “The degree to which an act of communication is ostensive to an individual is the 
degree to which it presumes to be optimally relevant to that individual.”  This elaboration of 
the communicative principle of relevance provides key insights when analyzing 
communication across multiple, indeterminate audiences.   
Sperber and Wilson provide other hints of the possibility of scalar ostension.  One such 
hint, already mentioned, is their mentioning of a “continuum of cases of ostension” 
(1995:53).  A stronger hint, though, is in their brief comment about how the presumption of 
relevance works in relation to indeterminate audiences (1995:158): 
The addressees of an act of ostensive communication are the individuals whose 
cognitive environment the communicator is trying to modify.  They can be specific 
individuals, as when Mary addresses Peter, or they may be individuals falling under 
a certain description, as when we address the present paragraph to all individuals 
who have read the book so far and found it relevant to them.  In broadcast 
communication, a stimulus can even be addressed to whoever finds it relevant.  The 
communicator is then communicating her presumption of relevance to whoever is 
willing to entertain it. 
Sperber and Wilson’s description of ostensive communication above discusses the 
possibility of a speaker offering a presumption of relevance (which requires that the 
speaker be ostensive about her communication) to an indeterminate audience such as a 
hypothetical reader of a book or a hypothetical audience of broadcast communication.  I will 
explore both of these illustrations in detail. 
In the case of a reader of a book, the reader adjusts his expectations of relevance in 
real-time as he reads the book.  If he finds his expectations of relevance satisfied, then he 
will be willing to invest more processing effort into the author’s utterances because of his 
trust in the author’s willingness and ability to offer stimuli that improve his understanding 
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of the world.  The reader also adjusts his expectations of relevance based on the topic or 
even on the basis of formatting (bold font, italics, underlining) or the location within the 
larger document (footnote, section heading, topic sentence, abstract, conclusion, etc.).  Even 
if the reader had never had any prior experience with a particular author or publisher, he 
could gain an increasingly strong expectation of to whom the author had intended his 
writing to be optimally relevant.  For example, publicly traded companies issue annual 
financial statements.  To some degree, the company presumes that its financial statements 
will be relevant to anyone who finds them interesting.  The casual reader could probably 
figure out, for example, whether or not the company was operating at a profit or a loss and 
derive some cognitive effects from that information.  However, a skilled financial analyst 
would be able to reap a lot more relevant information from the same communication 
because his cognitive environment shares a larger overlap with the authors’ idealized target 
audience.  In the case of a written public document (a published book, a public report, etc.), 
it is true that—as Sperber and Wilson suggested—the written communication is relevant to 
anyone who finds it interesting (1995:158).  However, the presumption of optimal 
relevance (versus the presumption of some relevance) would be true only for the idealized 
target audience.  
I will elaborate on the example of the company’s public financial statements to 
illustrate that both internal (indirect: “telling that”) and external (direct: “showing that”) 
evidence contribute to the presumption of relevance from the speaker and the expectation 
of relevance from the hearer.  The external (direct) evidence refers to the manner of 
delivery in making it ostensive that a speaker is making claims on her audience’s attention, 
while the internal (indirect) evidence refers to the audience’s ability to estimate the 
idealized target audience based on the content of the utterance.  In terms of direct evidence, 
a company could ostensify its presumption of relevance related to its financial statements to 
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different degrees:  by mailing some people a hard copy while making an electronic copy 
accessible to the general public on the company’s website.  Even though they ostensified 
their presumption of relevance in external terms more to the people to whom they mailed 
the hard copy than to the indeterminate audiences who were required to take their own 
initiative to access the electronic copy on the company’s website, this does not mean that 
the people who received a mailed copy were promised more relevance.  Rather, while 
reading the document, the reader would construct an opinion about how closely he 
resembles the idealized target audience (based upon both the direct and indirect evidence) 
and would adjust his expectations of relevance accordingly.   
The same principle is true for other types of communication across multiple audiences.  
For instance, a local newspaper does not presume to be equally relevant to all of its 
subscribers even though the publishers make their external ostension the same to all 
subscribers by delivering the same newspaper to their houses.  Even within a particular 
edition of the newspaper, certain articles or advertisements will be optimally relevant to 
different readers based on their respective cognitive environments.  The publishers of the 
newspaper realize that they are serving a wide variety of audiences:  local residents and 
visitors, the old and the young, those looking for a job and those who are not.  However, by 
limiting the presumption of relevance to whoever finds it interesting, Sperber and Wilson 
have delinked the presumption of relevance from the ostensive nature of the 
communication (1995:158).  Certainly, the fact that someone estimates that he falls within 
the author’s idealized target audience is convincing internal evidence that the text comes 
with a presumption of some relevance to that individual.  However, there is also the 
external evidence to consider.  The external evidence that the publishers delivered the 
newspaper to some, but not all, residents in a town indicates that the publishers had 
presumed some relevance to their specific customers.  Indeed, without subscribers the 
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newspaper would go out of business.  Thus, the newspaper publisher has split interests 
because she is addressing a wide variety of audiences (subscribers, the general public, 
whoever finds it interesting) and has a variety of intentions (to please the subscribers, to 
please the advertisers, to produce good journalism).  The newspaper publisher will 
calibrate the stimulus (the newspaper, both external and internal evidence) to accomplish 
the maximum benefit based on how she ranks her various priorities.   
The distinction between internal and external evidence of ostension has clear 
applications in the case of the Hearing.  On the one hand, the CEOs and Representatives 
provided external evidence of their communicative intentions by showing that they 
intended to communicate with each other:  They addressed each other, often by name; they 
made eye contact with each other; and they exchanged written statements that would later 
become public records.  On the other hand, an internal analysis of their conversations 
reveals that their idealized target audiences were frequently the shareholders and 
constituents.  Granted, the notion of scalar ostension does not allow an authoritative 
calculation of who the primary audience was, but it can certainly provide clues.  We can 
examine the external evidence and the internal evidence to form judgments about how the 
various speakers presumed their utterances to be relevant to their respective audiences.  In 
reality, the weighting of the internal and external evidence will vary from audience to 
audience and from occasion to occasion.   
A key contribution in the notion of scalar ostension is the recognition that a speaker 
can presume some, not necessarily optimal, relevance to an audience when she is trying to 
communicate to multiple audiences at the same time.  Further, this presumption of 
relevance varies with the level of ostension of the speaker’s utterance.  A Representative 
who has multiple intentions (i.e. a desire to produce an effect in the CEOs, a desire to 
produce an effect in her constituents, a desire to produce an effect in her fellow 
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Representatives, etc.) will—typically subconsciously—weight the priorities of these effects 
to try to achieve a maximal benefit from her utterance.  Likewise, a hearer can expect that a 
speaker is providing him with some, but not necessarily optimal, relevance, if he suspects 
that the speaker has intended her utterance to produce effects in other people besides 
himself.   
Next, let us consider Sperber and Wilson’s other example of an indeterminate audience, 
namely that of the audience of a broadcast communication, to whom the speaker presumed 
that her utterance would be relevant “to whoever is willing to entertain it” (1995:158).  As a 
specific example of broadcast communication, let us consider a televised news program.  
The producers of the program clearly realize that their different audiences will gain 
different amounts of relevance from a particular utterance6
                                                             
6 Or, as Unger (2006) properly notes, a speaker can presume relevance across a series of connected 
utterances, which is more appropriate for analyzing complex stimuli of more than one utterance. 
 based on factors such as the 
audience’s command of the broadcast language, familiarity with the content of the 
utterance, sympathy toward the political bias of the producers, and so on.  For any given 
utterance, the producers presume optimal relevance only for their idealized target 
audience.  However, given the public nature of broadcast communication, each hearer 
expects that the producers intended some degree of relevance to all of their audiences, 
variable based on the degree to which each hearer fits within the producer’s idealized target 
audience.  The hearer adjusts his expectation of relevance in real-time based on how well 
his expectations of relevance are being satisfied.  The notion of an idealized target audience 
does not require a hearer to possess a priori knowledge of the idealized target audience.   
Rather, the hearer naturally adjusts his expectations of relevance throughout the broadcast 
communication event.   
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Sperber and Wilson addressed the possibility of entertaining an ostensive intention 
beyond the communicative intention, but they dismissed this as unnecessary (1995:30-
31,60-64).  Their reason for dismissing the need to appeal to an ostensive intention was 
essentially that they had limited the domain of the principles of relevance to ostensive acts 
of communication.  In their model, the ostensive intention is conflated with the 
communicative intention, in which case it is “mutually manifest to audience and 
communicator that the communicator has [an] informative intention” (1995:61).  This is 
true for fully ostensive communication, in which case the ostensive nature of the 
communication is mutually manifest to the speaker and hearer.  However, in cases of 
communication to an indeterminate audience or other cases of scalar ostension, it is 
necessary to detangle the ostensive and the communicative intentions.  Thus, I have 
separated these intentions as follows: 
Table 2.  Speaker’s Intentions 
Intention Speaker's desire to… 
Intention is accomplished  
to the extent that… 
Ostensive 
intention 
inform the hearer of the degree to 
which she presumes her stimulus 
to be relevant to him 
the hearer recognizes the degree to 
which the speaker presumes her 
stimulus to be relevant to him 
Communicative 
intention inform the hearer of her informative intention 
the hearer understands the 
assumption of which the speaker is 
trying to inform him 
Informative 
intention inform the hearer of some assumption 
the hearer accepts as true the 
assumption of which the speaker is 
trying to inform him 
My elaboration of Sperber and Wilson’s examples of communication to indeterminate 
audiences supports my theory of scalar ostension.  The notion of scalar ostension explains, 
from the perspective of the hearer, how much she presumes her stimulus to be relevant to a 
possible audience and, from the hearer’s perspective, how much relevance he expects to 
gain from processing the speaker’s utterance.  The recognition of the degree of a speaker’s 
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ostension in communication is only one part of the communicative process, and this 
ostension is itself based on a combination of external and internal factors.7
Chapter 3
  A hearer who 
recognizes that a communicator intends to communicate with him still has the task of 
understanding what the speaker means.  As noted in , the task of understanding 
an utterance depends on the hearer’s ability to assign communicative and informative 
intentions to the speaker.  In the next section, I will illustrate through the notion of 
epistemic vigilance that the assignment and fulfillment of such intentions is fundamentally 
rooted in the trust that a hearer places in the speaker.  Then, in the subsequent section, I 
will summarize how persuasion and manipulation fit within a broader communicative 
theory, with particular emphasis on persuasion and manipulation across multiple 
audiences. 
4.3 Epistemic Vigilance 
As noted in Chapter 3, speakers and hearers each have their own costs, risks, and 
expected benefits when they engage in communication.  While the speaker desires to 
produce an effect in the hearer, there is always the risk of miscommunication.  Likewise, 
while the hearer desires to gain a better understanding of the world, he might not gain a 
better understanding of it or, worse yet, might gain false assumptions about the world.  
Interestingly, even though people typically want to know only true information8
                                                             
7 This corresponds to the continuum of cases of ostension in 
, the 
independent truth of a given assumption does not impact the individual’s cognitive 
processes so long as he holds the assumption as true.  Sperber and Wilson note:  “From a 
cognitive point of view, mistaken assumptions can be indistinguishable from genuine 
Figure 5, page 32. 
8 Granted, a hearer might desire to believe false assumptions if, for instance, the false assumptions 
satisfy a desire that the individual ranks higher than truth.  For example, an individual might want 
to believe false assumptions to promote social cohesion or to avoid discomfort. 
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factual knowledge, just as optical illusions can be indistinguishable from true sight” 
(1995:39).  Thus, if I believe that you are communicating to me in good faith when in reality 
you are lying to me, I will process your utterance just as though it were true even though it 
is not.  Most of us have realized at some point that some assumption we had held as certain 
turned out to be false.  
Sophisticated communicators realize that a speaker can intend her audience to accept a 
proposition that she herself does not believe.  To protect themselves from being misled, 
people have become epistemically vigilant; that is, they calibrate their trust to avoid 
accepting false information as though it were true (Sperber et al. 2010:359; see also 
Sperber 1994, 2001).  The higher the degree of trust that a hearer places in a speaker, the 
less processing effort that he will spend to assess the veracity of her statement.  If a hearer 
doubts a speaker who is actually behaving in a trustworthy manner, the hearer will spend 
extra processing effort without gaining any more cognitive benefits than if he had simply 
trusted her.  This corresponds to case three, “inefficient processing,” in Figure 7 below. 
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Figure 7.  Epistemic Vigilance and Processing Cost 
 
If, however, a hearer’s doubt is justified because the speaker is actually being 
untrustworthy, and if the hearer uncovers the speaker’s untrustworthy conduct, the 
avoidance of accepting false information will be worth the extra processing effort (case 
four, “deception averted”).  The human tendency to calibrate one’s trust in a situation to 
maximize cognitive benefits while minimizing processing effort is an application of the 
cognitive principle of relevance.  Because human cognition is geared toward the 
maximization of relevance, individuals adjust their trust based on their expectation of 
trustworthiness in both the speaker and her content.  In essence, the expectation of 
trustworthiness is a component of the expectation of relevance.  Both the speaker and the 
hearer have expectations about how much they trust each other, which affects both how 
much processing effort the hearer is willing to exert and how much relevant information he 
expects to infer. 
Sperber and his collaborators credit the human tendency toward epistemic vigilance as 
being foundational to making the sharing of information worthwhile.  They write, “The fact 
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people are able to calibrate their trust well enough to make it advantageous on average to 
both communicator and audience” (Sperber et al. 2010:360).  They go on to say, “Vigilance 
(unlike distrust) is not the opposite of trust; it is the opposite of blind trust” (2010:363).  
Thus, a hearer trusts a speaker when he believes that he has good reasons to trust her, such 
as on the basis of the his prior experiences with her, his estimation of her motives, the 
nature of the communication, etc.  Trusting reduces the effort required to process an 
utterance.  Likewise, the hearer is skeptical when he believes that he has good reasons to be 
skeptical.   The main areas of trust toward which a hearer exercises heightened epistemic 
vigilance are the honesty of the source, the competence of the source, the logical accuracy of 
the arguments, and the empirical truth of the content.   
In the case of the Hearing, the concept of epistemic vigilance is highly relevant.  While 
Sperber and his collaborators coined “epistemic vigilance” mainly to describe how an 
individual is careful to avoid accepting false assumptions for himself, the Hearing illustrates 
that the interlocutors were vigilant in preventing their target audiences from accepting 
“false”9
                                                             
9 By “false,” I am referring to any assumption that would go against the speaker’s intentions for his 
primary audience, which is independent of the actual truth or falsity of the assumption in the 
speaker’s mind or in the real world.  For example, a “false” assumption for the CEOs would be any 
assumption that would make their banks appear weak to their shareholders.   
 assumptions.  Acting on behalf of their primary audiences, the interlocutors battled 
with each other to prevent “false” assumptions from entering the mutual cognitive 
environment, lest their primary target audiences be led astray.  Similar to how one is 
skeptical of untrustworthy people or false content for oneself, so one can discredit a 
proposed assumption on behalf of another individual by discrediting the source of that 
assumption (competence or honesty of the speaker who supports it) or the logic or 
empirical truth of the assumption itself.    
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In addition, the concept of epistemic vigilance ties in with the cognitive principle of 
relevance to explain why the lack of trust reduces the efficiency of communication.  
Communicators who do not trust each other exert significant amounts of processing effort 
just to assess the veracity of an assumption.  In the Hearing, the Representatives and the 
CEOs did not cooperate with each other because they recognized that they had different 
goals10
Another important application of epistemic vigilance is the notion that in order to 
calibrate trust efficiently, hearers learn to have a generally trusting attitude toward some 
speakers whom they have consistently found to be trustworthy, and vice versa.  This has 
interesting implications for the importance of a speaker’s reputation (Sperber et al. 
2010:370):  
 that were not only different but also opposed to each other.  For their own parts, the 
CEOs and Representatives had their own beliefs and motivations so deeply entrenched that 
they were unlikely to persuade or convince each other to change positions on the issues.  
Therefore, the CEOs and Representatives exerted their processing effort not to assess the 
veracity of assumptions for their own consideration but rather to constrain what their 
primary audiences accepted as true.   
If we continually interact with the same people, misinforming them when it is to our 
own immediate advantage may damage our reputation and end up being costly in 
the long run.  Conversely, doing our best to be systematically trustworthy may 
sometimes be costly in the short run, but may be beneficial in the long run.  The 
tradeoff between the short term cost and long term benefits of a policy of 
                                                             
10 I am speaking specifically of their goals with regard to framing the CPP as a bailout or not.  
Granted, some of their other goals may be similar, different but not opposed to each other, or 
different and opposed to each other.  But the other goals are not a topic for this research. 
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trustworthiness may differ from person to person, depending, for instance, on the 
way they discount time. 
For the most part, the CEOs behaved professionally.  They avoided many behaviors that 
many of the Representatives engaged in shamelessly:  accusation, name-calling, and 
trickery.  After all, the CEOs had to maintain the reputation of their institutions, for which 
consistent faithfulness is more important than a quick rise and then a fall.  The 
Representatives, on the other hand, did not face quite as much immediate pressure; their 
re-election attempts were nearly twenty-one months away.  Furthermore, the 
Representatives knew that the public was angry both at the banking industry and at the 
government.  As a result, the Representatives were willing to engage in blame-shifting 
tactics to villainize the CEOs.   On the other hand, the CEOs did not have a need to blame the 
Representatives.  As long as they could deflect blame off their particular institutions, they 
did not particularly care about where the blame landed.   Interpreted through the 
framework of epistemic vigilance, these actions illustrate that the CEOs valued a consistent 
reputation of truthfulness whereas the politicians valued short-term gains.   
So far in Chapter 4 I have presented some theoretical claims about how communication 
works across multiple audiences.  In this section in particular, I have introduced the 
Relevance Theoretic concept of epistemic vigilance to illustrate the role of trust in the 
comprehension process of accepting an assumption as true.  The framework of epistemic 
vigilance will continue to be useful as I proceed to distinguish among informing, persuading, 
and manipulating.   In Section 4.4, I will elaborate on both the theory behind information 
transmission and the process of informing someone of something.  I will then use this model 




In speaking of “information transmission,” I have already introduced a common fallacy 
about information:  that it is possible to transmit or copy information from one person’s 
mind to another.  Such a view could be represented by the following diagram (U = 
Utterance of Speaker; A = Assumption, Circle = Cognitive Environment; Overlapped Circles 
= Mutual Cognitive Environment): 
Figure 8.  Information Transmission (Code Model) 
                                                  
In the diagram above, the speaker begins with an assumption in her cognitive environment 
that is not in the hearer’s cognitive environment.  After making an utterance, the 
assumption becomes shared information.   This diagram is one way to define informing, but 
it is lacking in many respects.  To begin, the utterance is not a code for an assumption in the 
speaker’s mind.  The assumption is a thought in the speaker’s mind, while the utterance is a 
stimulus to help the hearer uncover her thought.  The assumption(s) that the hearer 
recovers after processing the utterance will not be identical to the thought in the speaker’s 
mind.  Rather, if the communication was successful, it will be a close resemblance to the 
assumption of the speaker.  In addition, any assumption that the hearer recovers will go 
through further processing (provided that it was relevant to the hearer) to produce 
contextual implications, contradict a prior assumption, or strengthen a prior assumption.  
Thus, even if the speaker’s assumption (A) were transplanted directly into the hearer’s 
mind, would we then say that the speaker informed the hearer only of (A), or also the 
further assumptions that the speaker could have intended the hearer to make after 
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processing (A), or all of the assumptions that the hearer actually made regardless of 
whether or not the speaker intended such assumptions to be made.   To model informing as 
the transmission of determinate assumptions quickly becomes an absurd and impossible 
model to sustain. 
Rather than viewing communication as the transfer of information, Relevance Theory 
views the communication process as an ostensive-inferential process.  The speaker 
provides an ostensive stimulus from which she expects the hearer to be able to infer 
relevant information.  As noted in Section 4.2, I have extended Relevance Theory to cover 
communicative situations that are not fully ostensive.  In Figure 9 (below) I have provided a 
diagram of the communicative process.  I will proceed to link each section of the diagram 
with the Relevance Theoretic framework to illustrate holistically how communication 
works.  Then, in Sections 4.5 and 4.6, I will use this model to describe persuasive and 
manipulative utterances.    
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Figure 9.  Relevance Theory Communication Process11
  
 
                                                             
11 Of course, the linear nature of Figure 9 is a useful lie; human communication is an interactive 
process that is influenced in real time as the various items in Figure 9 influence each other and are 
themselves influenced by other stimuli.  This model simply provides a heuristic to look at the sub-
processes involved in communication. 
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4.4.1 The Intention 
As noted in Figure 9, the whole communicative process begins with the desire of a 
speaker to produce an effect in her audience.  This corresponds to the motivation of the 
speaker for entering into a communicative process.  In Table 2 (Page 39) I discussed three 
intentions:  the ostensive intention, the communicative intention, and the informative 
intention.  However, both the ostensive intention and the communicative intentions are 
themselves higher-order informative intentions:  the intentions to (1) inform one’s 
audience of the degree to which she presumes her stimulus to be relevant and (2) to inform 
one’s audience of her informative intention (for the purpose of understanding the speaker’s 
meaning; the actual informative intention is for accepting the speaker’s meaning).  Based on 
these definitions, all communication has its roots in the desire to inform someone of 
something. 12
4.4.2 The Plan 
  
The speaker who desires to produce an effect in her audience tries to choose the most 
efficient and effective way to achieve her goal, balanced, of course, by the constraints of 
other intentions that she values more highly.  If the speaker estimates that producing an 
effect in her audience would either be impossible or not worth the effort, then she will 
abandon her plan and not proceed to the next stage of producing a stimulus.  In the planning 
stage, the speaker considers the mutual cognitive environment that she shares with the 
audience to estimate how her audience will process possible stimuli that she might offer 
them.  She also considers the many constraints that limit the stimuli that she could offer, 
constraints such as her reputation, her moral convictions, or her other goals.  Remarkably, 
the speaker rarely has to consider the planning process consciously.  Only when the 
                                                             
12 Carey’s contrast between communication as transmission and communication as ritual falls 
outside my scope.  According to Carey’s classification, my analysis focuses on communication as 
transmission rather than communication as ritual (2002). 
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expected benefits are worth the high processing cost will the speaker spend much effort on 
the planning phase.  Most everyday speech is processed without the speaker’s awareness of 
her desired effect in her audience or her plan to produce that effect.    
From the speaker’s point of view, the main potential for failed communication in the 
planning phase is by a misjudgment of the mutual cognitive environment.  In addition to 
producing a less than ideal stimulus, the misjudgment of the mutual cognitive environment 
could cause a speaker to abandon a plan if she misjudges the cost or possibility of success.  
While the speaker has an idea of how a hearer could process her stimulus, she cannot know 
for sure because no two people share identical cognitive environments.   
4.4.3 The Stimulus Offered 
After creating a plan to accomplish her intentions, the speaker proceeds to carry out 
her plan by offering a stimulus to the hearer.  In the planning phase, the speaker has already 
determined how ostensive she wants to make the stimulus.  Her offering of the stimulus 
could fail as a result of poor execution, such as when a speaker does not enunciate well 
enough for the hearer to perceive the stimulus as intended.    
4.4.4 The Stimulus Perceived 
Whereas the speaker offers the stimulus, the hearer perceives and processes it.  Of 
course, the linear nature of my model (Figure 9) is an over-simplification of the process.  
For instance, the hearer begins to perceive and process the stimulus before the speaker has 
finished offering it.  In fact, before the speaker has finished her utterance, the hearer may 
have already anticipated the remainder of the utterance, processed it until his expectations 
of relevance were met, and prepared his own reply.  Thus, the linear nature of this model 
(Figure 9) is simply to provide a heuristic of the various sub-processes involved in the 
process of communication.  
51 
At the stage of the hearer’s perceiving the stimulus, the communication could fail if the 
hearer either misperceives the stimulus, such as when background noise prohibits the 
accurate perception of an utterance.  Or, perhaps the hearer’s perceptive abilities are 
impaired in a way that is not manifest to the speaker.  In the case of a covert or only 
partially ostensive stimulus, the hearer might not even recognize the stimulus or might not 
find it as relevant even if recognized, thus leading to communication failure.   
4.4.5 Processing for Ostension 
To help the hearer form his expectations of relevance, he will assess how ostensively—
if at all—the stimulus was communicated to him.  The hearer perceives that a speaker 
presumes her utterance (or other stimulus) to be relevant to him to the degree that she 
ostensifies her communicative intention.  If he concludes that the stimulus was not 
ostensively communicated to him, then he will continue to process the stimulus only if he 
independently finds it worth processing further.  As soon as he stops deriving contextual 
effects, he stops.   
A communication could fail (at least partially) if the hearer does not perceive the same 
level of ostension that the speaker presumed to have offered.  This would be the result of a 
mismatch in their mutual cognitive environments.   
When assessing a stimulus for scalar ostension—especially a stimulus that is intended 
for multiple audiences—the hearer considers both direct evidence (such as the fact that the 
speaker is addressing the hearer directly) and indirect evidence (such as the fact that the 
speaker’s utterance does not achieve much relevance for the hearer but achieves a lot of 
relevance for another audience member).  This corresponds to the concept of scalar 
ostension that I presented in Section 4.2. 
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4.4.6 Processing for Understanding 
As part of the inference process, the hearer also tries to understand the speaker’s 
intended meaning.  The hearer follows the path of least effort in computing cognitive effects 
until his expectations have been satisfied or abandoned.  In the case of a non-ostensive 
stimulus, the hearer takes responsibility for his own presumption of relevance.   
4.4.7 Processing for Acceptance 
As the hearer infers meaning from the stimulus, he decides to what degree he will 
accept the inferred meaning as true.  This depends on his trust in the source’s honesty and 
competence, his trust in the logic of any arguments, or his trust in the empirical truth of the 
content.  In the case of non-ostensive communication, the hearer assesses his trust in his 
own observational skills (the empirical truth of the content), reasoning abilities, motives, 
and competence.   
4.4.8 Processing for Additional Relevance 
The hearer continues to process a stimulus until he no longer receives adequate 
cognitive effects for his processing effort.  In other words, each newly derived assumption 
will itself be a stimulus available to the hearer for additional processing.  If the hearer finds 
the newly derived assumption more relevant than other stimuli, he will continue to process 
it as long as he perceives it to be the most relevant stimulus to process at the time.  If there 
are other stimuli that are immediately available but would be lost forever if not processed 
immediately, a hearer might postpone the processing of such a stimulus and resume 
processing it later on when the stimulus resumes its status as the stimulus in which the 
hearer has the highest expectations of relevance.   
4.5 Persuading 
In Section 4.4 I described the Relevance Theoretic account of informing someone of 
something.  Based on the model in Figure 9 (Page 48), this begins as an intention in the 
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speaker’s mind to produce a desired effect in the hearer.  To what extent, if at all, is 
informing different from persuading?  In terms of the communication model, there is no 
difference.  After all, in persuading, one also wants to produce a desired effect in the hearer.  
Thus, within the Relevance Theoretic framework there is no need to appeal to a special 
model for persuasive communication (for an alternative view, see Taillard 2000, 2002).   In 
Relevance Theory, the fulfillment of the communicative intention results in understanding, 
while the fulfillment of the informative intention results in acceptance.  To successfully 
persuade someone, then, is simply to have one’s informative intention fulfilled.  Any appeal 
to a persuasive intention is, then, just a nuanced version of the informative intention.   
While there is no linguistic basis for a distinction between persuading and informing, 
the concept of epistemic vigilance helps to explain the nuanced difference between 
informing and persuading that we experience in everyday speech.  Specifically, the 
difference between informing and persuading is in the expected or perceived degree of 
vigilance exercised by the hearer, from the speaker’s and hearer’s perspectives, 
respectively.  The amount of vigilance, in turn, is dependent on the amount of trust in the 
source or the content.   






Accordingly, the less vigilance expected (by the speaker) or exerted (by the hearer), the 
more a communicative exchange resembles mere informing.  Conversely, the more vigilance 








resembles persuasion.  In this nuanced definition, the degree to which a stimulus is deemed 
to be persuasive is decided independently by the speaker and the hearer.  The Relevance 
Theory communication model in Figure 9 (Page 48) fully accounts for the impact of trust on 
communication by considering the epistemic vigilance of the hearer.  The speaker takes the 
hearer’s epistemic vigilance into account during her planning phase, while the hearer 
exercises epistemic vigilance throughout his processing sub-tasks. 
Because my definition of persuasion is linked to the concept of trust, I take for granted 
that most of the utterances from the Hearing were of a persuasive nature because of the 
lack of trust among the direct and indirect participants.  I will now turn to an example of 
persuasive tactics from the Hearing.  In this example, Rep. Cleaver employs a clever use of 
direct quotations to insult the CEOs without claiming responsibility for the legitimacy of the 
opinions expressed.  I have divided his comment below into seven sections (18a-g), the first 
and last of which (18a,g) are bookends that explain the direct quotations from his 
constituents in (18b-f) (Hearing:76-77): 
18.    (a)  I have about seven pages of questions that were sent to me from my 
districts.  I represent Kansas City, Missouri, and Independence, Missouri. 
(b)  ‘‘How dare you!’’—Judy from Kansas City.   
(c)   “Why are you squeezing us dry with fees and increasing credit card rates 
but lining your own pockets?”—Alice from Raymore. 
(d)  “Since you are the experts with the big pay, why did you screw up?”—Ben.   
(e)  “How big is your yacht?”—Michelle.   
(f)  “Do you really believe that you are that smart?” 
(g)  I read these only because I think everybody conveyed to you that people are 
angry. 
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After declaring that he had seven pages of questions from his constituents, Rep. Cleaver 
chose five comments (18b-f) as being particularly relevant to the conversation.  Thus, he 
claims responsibility for presuming that these comments would be of some relevance to his 
various audiences.  However, by directly quoting others, he does not claim responsibility for 
the truth of what his constituents expressed.  After quoting them, he even explains that he 
has read these comments to reinforce the fact that his constituents are angry at the CEOs.   
In terms of the external (direct/“showing”) evidence of Rep. Cleaver’s ostension, Rep. 
Cleaver gives direct evidence to the CEOs that he is talking to them by addressing them 
directly.  Even some internal (indirect/“telling”) evidence reveals that he has an informative 
intention.  Specifically, he states in (18g) that he expects his utterances (18b-f) to achieve 
relevance by informing the CEOs that people are angry at them.  In regard to the 
presumption of relevance, however, the internal evidence suggests that Rep. Cleaver likely 
presumes his utterance to communicate only some, but not optimal, relevance to the CEOs.  
To begin, the fact that the public was angry at the CEOs was already manifest to the CEOs.  
This fact did not need more reinforcement at this point in the Hearing, which was about 
three-fourths of the way through the daylong Hearing during which the CEOs were 
constantly reminded of the anger of the American people.  Further, Rep. Cleaver could not 
have expected to convince the CEOs of the veracity of his constituents’ insults.  Surely, he 
realized that these insults would come up against beliefs that the CEOs held more strongly, 
resulting in the dismissal of the propositions expressed in the insults in (18b-f). 
While the anger of Rep. Cleaver’s constituents was not highly relevant to the CEOs, Rep. 
Cleaver’s comments were highly relevant to his constituents.  Indeed, Rep. Cleaver quoted 
his constituents to let them know that he had been listening to them, that he found their 
comments important, and that he was being a faithful Representative by voicing their 
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concerns.  In addition, their direct quotations supplied additional support to his argument 
that the CEOs were not trustworthy.    
The CEOs, however, were aware that this was a public hearing and that the 
Representatives had split intentions.  Therefore, the CEOs undoubtedly realized that Rep. 
Cleaver had intended his comments to be relevant primarily to his constituents.  After 
making this realization, they would have abandoned further pursuits of finding much 
relevance for themselves.   
Below I have included an abbreviated form of the Relevance Theory communication 
model that I presented in Figure 9, Page 48.   





Rep. Cleaver desires the CEOs to 
accept as true the fact that his 
constituents are angry with them. 
Rep. Cleaver desires his constituents 
to accept as true the fact that he is a 
good Representative. 
Develop Plan Rep. Cleaver plans to quote some of the comments from his constituents. 
Offer Stimulus Rep. Cleaver recites the direct quotations from his constituents.  
Perceive 
Stimulus CEOs perceive the utterances. 




CEOs infer that Rep. Cleaver wants 
them to know that his constituents 
are angry with them.  (This 
assumption was obvious to them 
before Rep. Cleaver’s utterance.)  
CEOs infer that Rep. Cleaver must 
have intended his comments to be 
relevant primarily to his 
constituents. 
The constituents infer that Rep. 
Cleaver is voicing their concerns and 
is therefore a good Representative.  
The constituents infer that there are 
a lot of good reasons to be angry 
with the CEOs and to blame them for 
the financial crisis.  The constituents 
find Rep. Cleaver’s utterance highly 
relevant. 
Table 3 (above) illustrates that Rep. Cleaver was able to accomplish multiple intentions 
with a single utterance.  By being at least somewhat relevant to multiple audiences, Rep. 
                                                             
13 Of course, this is all based on my analysis of the text and may not reflect the speaker’s actual 
intentions or the hearers’ inferred meaning.   
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Cleaver left his precise intentions inexplicit and allowed the various audiences to read as 
much or as little as they wanted to into his intentions.  This allows him to be persuasive 
without proof of his intentions.  If he were accused of insulting the CEOs, he could deny it, 
stating that he was simply passing along comments from his constituents.  If he were 
accused of false flattery toward his constituents, he could deny that as well, stating that he 
was simply trying to convey their anger to the CEOs so that they would behave better.  
Generally speaking, the presence of multiple audiences makes it harder to prove a speaker’s 
intentions than if the speaker were speaking to only a single hearer.  As a result, it also 
makes it easier for a speaker to deny that she even had a particular intention. 
My goal is not to come up with a fully classificatory definition of persuasion or to 
review various theories of persuasion.  Rather, my goal is to provide a Relevance-Theoretic 
account of persuasion to illustrate that the intuitive notions about the difference between 
informing and persuading are best explained by an appeal to epistemic vigilance, which is 
essentially an appeal to trust.  Because Relevance Theory accounts for the role of epistemic 
vigilance in communication, it is an ideal model to analyze intuitively persuasive 
communicative exchanges across multiple audiences.  In Section 4.6, I will proceed to 
provide a Relevance Theoretic account of manipulation. 
4.6 Manipulating 
Similar to my conclusions on persuasion, I also contend that manipulation does not 
constitute a linguistically distinct type of communication.   Rather than being a linguistic 
distinction, the intuitive notions of manipulation actually depend on the correlation 
between speaker belief and speaker meaning, which is a consideration of a fact in the world 
that is independent of the linguistic form of the utterance.14
                                                             
14 Here I am dealing specifically with deception, which is a clear case of manipulation.  It is also 
possible to consider manipulation apart from deception, such as when one manipulates by means 
  From the perspective of a 
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speaker, her communicated stimulus is manipulative to the extent that she intends the 
hearer to accept assumptions as true that she herself believes to be false.15
11
  From the 
perspective of the hearer, a perceived stimulus is manipulative to the extent that the hearer 
believes that the speaker intends him to believe something that the speaker herself does not 
believe.  The following remark by Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf, quoted earlier as Example 
( ), helps to illustrate this point:   
  11.  Mr. Stumpf:  “We are Americans first, and we are bankers second.” 
19. Mr. Stumpf’s intentions in uttering (11):  to inform the audiences that the CEOs 
have the best interests of the country as a higher ranked priority than their own 
banks’ profitability; to inform the audiences that the CEOs would not take 
advantage of the American people. 
It is possible that Mr. Stumpf sincerely believes the message that he is trying to 
communicate to his various audiences.  It is also possible that he does not believe the 
assumptions that he is trying to communicate.  To the extent that he does not believe what 
he intended his audiences to believe, his utterance could be considered manipulative.  Each 
individual can have a different perception of the degree to which a stimulus is manipulative.  
For example, Mr. Stumpf might personally believe that which he intended his audience to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
of power but does not need to conceal the manipulation.  In any event, whether manipulation 
involves deception or not, the manipulative speech does not constitute a linguistically distinct type 
of communication. 
15 I have worded my definition of manipulation carefully to avoid any correlation to actual truth.  For 
instance, Gibbs and Bryant (2008) found that people tend to give rounded answers when asked for 
the time in order to optimize relevance for the hearer.  Telling someone that the time is noon when 
it is 11:58 a.m. would not be manipulation by my definition unless the speaker expected the hearer 
to believe that the time was exactly noon.    
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believe.  Yet the Representatives might believe that he is merely purporting to believe it 
even though he probably does not.  In such a case, Mr. Stumpf would view his utterance as 
non-manipulative, while the Representatives would view it as (at least somewhat) 
manipulative. 
As another important consideration, a manipulative stimulus might be offered either 
ostensively or non-ostensively (covertly).  For example, a lie that is ostensively and 
intentionally communicated to someone would be manipulation.  In covert communication, 
part of the speaker’s intended meaning is that the hearer would detect a level of ostension 
different from what the speaker knows to be true.   By my definition of manipulation, 
therefore, intentional covert communication is always manipulative.   
Further, my definition of manipulation states nothing about the ethics of manipulation.  
For example, a teacher might give her student a hint to a test problem but not want the 
student to realize that he received a hint, preferring that the student thinks he came up with 
the clue on his own.  Because the teacher’s ostensive intention was different from what she 
wanted her student to infer, she manipulated him; but that does not make her behavior 
unethical.  Indeed, it is not my goal to comment on the ethics of communication.  Rather, I 
simply desire to show that the manipulative nature of a communication (according to my 
definition) does not impact the cognitive processes involved in producing or understanding 
a stimulus.  It very well may affect the results of the communication process, but the 
utterance itself is still processed using the same process as any utterance.  Therefore, the 
same Relevance Theory model that I presented in Chapter 3 and Section 4.4 applies to 
manipulative just as well as to non-manipulative communicative exchanges.   
This chapter has been mostly the presentation of theories about how communication 
works, with a particular emphasis on how it works across multiple audiences.  In the next 
chapter (Chapter 5), I will use the theories laid out so far to analyze how the CEOs and 
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Representatives tried to persuade their audiences concerning the nature of the Capital 




LEXICAL CHOICES:  WAS IT A BAILOUT? 
As stated in Section 4.1, the CEOs and Representatives altered their speech in 
consideration of the other audiences who had access to their utterances.  Because there 
were multiple audiences involved, the Representatives and CEOs had split intentions.  One 
of the central claims of this paper is that the Relevance Theoretic notion of the presumption 
of optimal relevance should be reformulated to account for such split intentions toward 
multiple audiences.  I addressed this issue by positing the notion of scalar ostension 
(Section 4.2), which states that an audience considers both external (manner of delivery) 
and internal (content of the utterance) evidence in determining the degree to which the 
speaker presumes her utterance to be optimally relevant.  The consideration of how an 
utterance is relevant to another audience is a key consideration in determining how much 
relevance a hearer expects to find for himself.   
In this chapter, I will turn my attention to the lexical choices of the interlocutors.  The 
CEOs, for their part, remained steadfast in their use of terms that constrained their 
audiences to view them in a positive way.   The Representatives, on the other hand, 
consistently used terminology that carried negative implicatures regarding the CEOs.  The 
same Relevance Theoretic concepts of communication that apply to understanding the 
meaning of an utterance also apply to understanding the meaning of a word.  The word 
choice patterns of the interlocutors reveal their intentions regarding what they want their 
audiences to believe with regard to this central question:  Was the CPP a bailout or not?  
This question could be stated another way:  Are the banks to blame for the financial crisis? 
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One subtle persuasive device that both interlocutors wielded was their terminology in 
referring to the CPP.   On a technical note, the CPP was structured as an investment by the 
US government in various banks.  The banks who received investments were required to 
pay dividends to the government (similar to the interest payments on a loan); thus, the CPP 
investments were by no means free to the banks.  In addition, the banks were expected to 
repurchase their investments from the government as soon as the financial system had 
stabilized.  On another note, some of the banks who received investments under the CPP 
told the US government that they did not even want the government’s money, yet they 
ended up accepting it anyway to show support for the government’s efforts to stabilize the 
financial system.   
While the fact that the CPP was structured as an investment was mutually manifest to 
both sets of interlocutors, the Representatives used a wide variety of terms to suggest that 
the CPP investment was more like a free government handout that the government was 
coerced into providing.  The term bailout, for instance, is a metaphor with negative 
connotations toward the entity being bailed out.  Bailout can refer to the process of 
removing water from a sinking ship.  It can also refer to the posting of a payment on behalf 
of someone who has been accused of a wrongdoing so that he can be released from police 
custody until he stands trial.  Granted, the term bailout has become so pervasive that it has 
become less like a creative metaphor and more like a conventionalized idiom (see 
Pilkington 2000:100-108).  The dictionary publisher Merriam-Webster selected bailout 
(defined as “a rescue from financial distress”) as its word of the year for 2008, citing that 
bailout “received the highest intensity of lookups on Merriam-Webster online over the 
shortest period of time.”16
                                                             
16 Merriam-Webster Online. “Word of the Year 2008.”  
  Regardless of the imagery that the term bailout evokes, it 
http://www/merriam-webster.com/info/ 
08words.htm.  Last accessed on July 14, 2011. 
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definitely has negative connotations with regard to the entity being bailed out.  Perhaps the 
best proof of this is the fact that the CEOs themselves refused to use the term bailout.  The 
table below shows the use of the bailout terminology during the Hearing with reference to 
the CPP/TARP17
Table 4.  Bailout Terminology 
:   
# Speaker Utterance Page 
1 Rep. Barrett 









Hensarling Many said that Congress would never bail them out 44 
4 
Rep. 
Hensarling now we have bailed them out 44 
5 Rep. Garrett 
the federal government stepped in and helped bail 
out AIG 47 
6 Rep. Garrett 
what was the need of the [Federal Reserve] to step in 
at that point to bail them out? 48 
7 Rep. McCotter 
the reports about the failure of the Wall Street 
bailout to date has caused a lot of concern. 53 
8 Rep. McCotter 
It is so difficult for [my constituents] to get credit 
despite the Wall Street bailout that they were told 
would work. 53 
9 Rep. Baca How do you feel about the bailout?   63 
10 Rep. Baca Do you feel the bailout was necessary? 63 
11 Rep. Baca 
We [the federal government] are the ones who have 
to bail you out because of what you've done 64 
12 Rep. Lynch 
[My constituents] are being asked to bail the banks 
out, you folks out 68 
13 Rep. Lynch 
[Is there a way to avoid putting] all these bailouts on 
the backs of the American taxpayer? 68 
14 Rep. Speier 
the biggest financial institutions both in size and in 
their bailout receipts 93 
                                                             
17 The CPP was one program under the broader umbrella of TARP.  In Table 4, I include uses of the 
term bailout for both CPP funds and other references to TARP.  The interlocutors frequently 
interchanged the terms TARP and CPP even though the CPP was only one component of TARP.    
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Of the fourteen references to the TARP funds as a bailout, all of the speakers were 
Representatives.  Indeed, the CEOs never used this term.  To do so would have been to 
admit guilt.  Rather, the CEOs preferred to refer to the TARP funds in more technical 
terminology.  Table 5 (below) shows the various speakers who referred to TARP funds as a 
government investment in the banks.  Referring to the TARP funds as an investment 
highlighted the mutual benefit of the deal:  the US government earned returns on its 
investments in the banks, while the CEOs benefited from the ability to use the government’s 
investment to earn an additional profit.  Of particular note, all eight CEOs used this 
language.   
Table 5.  Investment Terminology 
Key Speaker Utterance Page 
1 Rep. Frank 
we need to get…the government investment out of 
the banks as soon as we can. 4 
2 
Rep. 
Neugebauer the American people have invested in your entities 9 
3 CEO Blankfein 
receiving this investment under the Capital Purchase 
Program 9 
4 CEO Blankfein receiving the government's investment 10 
5 CEO Blankfein 
We look forward to paying back the government's 
investment 11 
6 CEO Dimon the investment the government made to us in TARP 11 
7 CEO Kelly in exchange for the [US Government's] $3 investment 13 
8 CEO Kelly 
We also fully intend to deliver a very good return on 
investment to taxpayers. 14 
9 CEO Lewis investors, including taxpayers, can earn returns 14 
10 CEO Lewis 
generate returns for investors, now including US 
taxpayers 15 
11 CEO Logue the taxpayers' investment 15 
12 CEO Logue 
we are pleased to have an opportunity to describe 
our use of [the CPP] investment 15 
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Table 5.  Investment Terminology (cont.) 
Key Speaker Utterance Page 
13 CEO Logue 
our $2 billion investment from the Capital Purchase 
Program 16 
14 CEO Mack the TARP investment 17 
15 CEO Mack 
as a recipient of an investment from the US 
government… 17 
16 CEO Pandit 
[the American people] have a right to expect a return 
on this investment 18 
17 CEO Pandit 
we are committed to providing the American public a 
return on its investment 19 
18 CEO Pandit 
We will pay the US government $3.4 billion in annual 
dividends on that investment. 19 
19 CEO Pandit 
our goal, my goal, is to make this a profitable 
investment for the American people 19 
20 CEO Stumpf the US Treasury invested in Wells Fargo 20 
21 CEO Stumpf the investment by the government 20 
22 CEO Stumpf 
we will use the investment by the government to 
help make more loans 20 
23 CEO Stumpf this taxpayer investment 20 
24 CEO Stumpf 
an investment in the future economic growth of our 
country 20 
25 Rep. Bacchus 
this is going to be one of [the taxpayers'] best 
investments 24 
26 Rep. Bacchus we are going to make money on that investment 24 
27 Rep. Sherman The first $254 billion of TARP money was invested 49 
28 Rep. Sherman as much as the Treasury was investing 49 
29 CEO Pandit 
my goal is to make this an extremely profitable 
investment for the US government 50 
30 CEO Pandit 
we are paying $3.4 billion annually as dividends on 
this investment 50 
What is particularly interesting is that all of the CEOs consistently used investment 
terminology to the exclusion of bailout terminology, which was used exclusively by the 
Representatives.  The bailout and investment terminologies were at odds with each other: 
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Figure 11.  Bailout vs. Investment 
 
Figure 11 illustrates each speaker’s desire to control how the CPP was conceptualized by 
the various audiences of the event:  Was it a bailout or an investment?  
Continuing in the review of lexical choices, I will focus on the use of SPEND.18
20
  After 
reviewing three possible senses of SPEND, I will review the use of SPEND in the Hearing.  
Consider SPEND as used in the following sentences ( a-d) and corresponding to the 
senses defined in (21a-c): 
20.  (a)   SPEND*:  Thomas SPENT* $10 on a pizza. 
 (b)  SPEND**:  Thomas SPENT** $10 by loaning it to his brother, who will pay 
him back in three days. 
 (c)  SPEND***:  Thomas SPENT*** $20 today:  $10 to buy a pizza for lunch and 
$10 to loan to his brother.   
(d)  SPEND*,**,***:  Thomas SPENT*/SPENT**/SPENT*** $10 by loaning it to his 
brother. 
21.  (a)   SPEND*:  to pay out for an expense (no direct relation to an expectation of  
future cash inflows) 
                                                             
18 By placing a word in all capital letters, I am referring to the use of the word in the complete variety 
of acceptable uses within the word’s semantic range of meaning.  For a specific sense of the word, I 
will place a consistent number of asterisks after the word. 
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 (b)  SPEND**:  to pay out for an asset; to invest (a direct relation to an 
expectation of future cash inflows) 
(c)  SPEND***:  to pay out (for any purpose) 
In Example (20a), the sense of SPEND* is such that Thomas gives $10 to someone in 
exchange for a pizza, and the person to whom he gives the $10 will not give it back to him. 
The $10 now belongs to the seller of the pizza, and in exchange for the $10, Thomas has a 
pizza.  In abstract terms, this could be considered an investment in the pizza, which will 
provide Thomas with energy that will help him to earn additional money.  However, a 
crucial characteristic of SPEND* is the short-term nature of the acquired benefit.  While 
theoretically possible, it would sound awkward to say that Thomas invested $10 in a pizza 
without changing the meaning of the sentence, for instance, to mean that Thomas intended 
to sell the slices of the pizza in exchange for a profit.   
In the case of (20b), however, the sense of SPEND** is such that it could be replaced by 
the word invest.  The difference between SPEND* and SPEND** can be addressed easily by 
answering the following questions:  Was it for a short-term benefit such as a meal (in 
accounting terminology, this would be labeled an expense and equate to SPEND*), or was it 
expected to result in future cash inflows (which, in accounting terms, would be an asset and 
equate to SPEND**)?   This distinction is noted well by Example (20d).   Someone who knew 
that Thomas’ brother had a history of  not repaying loans could utter (20d, SPEND*) to 
mean that Thomas will never see his $10 again.  In another instance, someone who expected 
Thomas’ brother to repay the loan would utter (20d) in the sense of SPEND**.   Still, 
someone else could utter (20d) in the sense of SPEND*** without making any value 
judgment about whether or not Thomas’ brother is likely to repay the loan.    
It is worth asking how many possible senses of SPEND there are.  Would it not be more 
accurate to consider all senses of SPEND to have the basic meaning of SPEND***, which is 
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vague and could apply to all cases?  In such a view, the subtle distinctions between SPEND* 
and SPEND** could be settled by contextual factors.   While such a view is appealing in its 
simplicity and consistency, it fails to describe the cognitive processes that are involved in 
inferring meaning from words.  As a brief explanation, just as an utterance is offered as a 
clue from which a hearer can infer the speaker’s meaning, so also a word is a clue from 
which the hearer can infer meaning that may be broader (SPEND*** as in to pay out for any 
purpose) or narrower (SPEND** as in to pay out for an asset; to invest) in a given context.  
While a word is partly a code, the actual meaning of a word is only partially encoded; the 
rest of the meaning is inferred from context.  (For more on how the meaning of a word is 
fine-tuned in context, see the Relevance Theory literature on lexical pragmatics in Wilson 
2003 and Wilson and Carston 2007.) 
In the Hearing, there were four uses of SPEND that referred specifically to how the 
banks used the money that the government invested in them through the Capital Purchase 
Program.  These uses are listed below: 
Table 6.  SPEND Terminology 
Key Speaker Utterance Page 
1 Rep. Kanjorski 
today we will learn how some of the richest and most 
powerful men in America are spending billions of 
dollars of taxpayer money 5 
2 Rep. Barrett 
you owe my constituents some explanation on…how 
you spent their money 6 
3 Rep. Biggert 
We don’t believe that taxpayer money has been spent 
wisely 7 
4 Rep. Frank 
if you think you are being ill-treated by our requests 
that you tell us how you spent it [CPP money], we 
will take it back 22 
To no one’s surprise, only the Representatives used SPEND to describe how the banks put 
the government’s money to work.  The CEOs would not use SPEND to describe how they 
used the CPP funds because of the possible ambiguity in how SPEND could be interpreted:   
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22.  (a)   SPEND*:  The money was paid out, and now it is gone.  The implication is  
that the banks are running out of money and will not be able to repay the 
taxpayers. 
 (b)  SPEND** :  The money was invested; it is expected to be repaid.  The 
implication is that the banks are being faithful managers of the taxpayers’ 
money.  The taxpayers will be repaid with interest. 
 (c)  SPEND***:  The money was paid out.  The implication is that the speaker is 
not making a value judgment on whether or not the money will be repaid.   
Because the CEOs could use the term invest to constrain the implicatures to the favorable 
ones of SPEND** (22b) without the associated risks of the negative implicatures of SPEND* 
(22a), they avoided the use of SPEND altogether, preferring to use investment terminology 
instead.  Further, the CEO’s investment terminology emphasized that the taxpayers were 
likely to make a profit from their investment in the banks, thus implying that the taxpayers 
were beneficiaries rather than victims.    
Overall, the Representatives exploited the multiple senses of SPEND to encourage 
audience members to view the CEOs as having SPENT* (paid out and used up) the CPP 
funds, which portrays them as being financially irresponsible and, therefore, worthy of 
blame for the state of the financial crisis.  The stark contrast between the CEOs’ and the 
Representatives’ lexical choices supports my view that the CEOs used the more specific 
investment terminology to limit the implicatures of the various audiences, while the 
Representatives used the more negative bailout terminology and the ambiguous 
SPEND*/SPEND**/SPEND*** terminology because they intended their constituents to infer 
a range of possible meanings based on their varied expectations.   
In this chapter I have reviewed the impact that multiple audiences have on a speaker’s 
lexical choices.  By using a word with multiple established senses, the Representatives gave 
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their hearers the option to infer a negative sense of the word SPEND* (the CEOs SPENT* the 
taxpayers’ money, and now it is gone) while also allowing the more accurate sense SPEND** 
(the CEOs invested/SPENT** the taxpayers’ money and intend to pay it back with interest).  
To the extent that the Representatives were trying to imply SPEND* when they actually 
believed SPEND**, they were also being manipulative according to my definition in Section 




My analysis of persuasive and manipulative communication across multiple audiences  
has several implications for how to apply Relevance Theory to situations that are less than 
fully ostensive.  To begin, in Section 4.1 I illustrated that the presences of multiple audiences 
results in the existence of multiple cognitive environments.  To the extent that different 
assumptions are mutually manifest between a speaker and her various audiences, the 
speaker may intend her various audiences to infer different meanings from her utterance.  
When a communicator addresses multiple audiences simultaneously, she does not typically 
presume her utterance to be equally relevant to all of them.  This presents a problem for the 
Relevance Theoretic notion of the presumption of optimal relevance.    
To resolve this issue, I proposed the notion of scalar ostension in Section 4.2.   The 
notion of scalar ostension posits that a speaker can communicate that she is offering less 
than optimal relevance to her various addressees.  Further, in offering a scale of relevance 
to her audiences, the speaker uses both external (manner of delivery) and internal (content 
of the stimulus) clues to help her audiences detect the degree to which they should expect 
the stimulus to be relevant to them.  The clarification of the different types of ostension 
(external and internal) resolves another problem with the presumption of optimal 
relevance, namely that the hearer assumes that the speaker is attempting to be optimally 
relevant before the hearer even begins to process the stimulus.  In cases of multiple 
audiences, however, this presents a problem because the hearer does not always expect 
that the speaker is attempting to be optimally relevant specifically to him.  In such 
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instances, the hearer expects that the speaker is attempting to offer him some, but not 
optimal, relevance.  As a result, the hearer places some level of responsibility on the speaker 
and considers the speaker to be communicating poorly or deceptively if his expectations of 
relevance are not satisfied.  However, because he recognizes that the speaker is offering him 
only some (not optimal) relevance, he takes responsibility for some of his own expectations 
of relevance.    
Further, by appealing to the role of internal evidence,  I emphasized that the hearer 
adjusts his expectations of relevance throughout his processing of the utterance.  The 
hearer revises his expectation of relevance in real time along with his attempt at inferring 
meaning, adjusting both the expectation of relevance and the recovery of relevance until the 
hearer gains sufficient benefits and then stops processing.   
In the remainder of Chapter 4, I offered a comprehensive model of the communicative 
process with an emphasis on persuasive and manipulative communication across multiple 
audiences.  In Section 4.4 I provided a Relevance Theoretic account of informing  someone 
of something that incorporates my notion of scalar ostension.  Then, in Section 4.5 I 
proposed a Relevance Theoretic distinction between informing and persuading that is 
rooted in the notions of trust and epistemic vigilance (see also Section 4.3) and not based 
on any linguistic factor.  I concluded  Chapter 4 by providing a Relevance Theoretic account 
of manipulation (specifically deception) that is rooted in the correspondence between a 
speaker’s implied meaning and a speaker’s actual beliefs.  Throughout Chapter 4 I applied 
my accounts of informing, persuading, and manipulating to communication that is aimed at 
multiple audiences.   
Finally, in Chapter 5 I provided an extended example of how the presence of multiple 
audiences affects the speaker’s word choice so that a speaker can intend a specific word to 
mean different things to different people.   
73 
My analysis has some profound applications for Relevance Theory.  Specifically, by 
detangling the ostensive intention from the communicative intention (Table 2, Page 39), I 
have suggested a basis for expanding the domain of Relevance Theory to communicative 
situations that are only partially ostensive or that may not even be ostensive at all.  To my 
knowledge, my work is unique in the way that I attempt to apply Relevance Theory to 
communication across multiple audiences.  As a result, I am sure that the theories that I 
have proposed would benefit from additional research and refinement.   
In addition to promoting additional applications to Relevance Theory, I have attempted 
to provide a model for analyzing communicative situations across multiple audiences.  I 
intend for my descriptions of persuasion and manipulation to be of value to anyone who is 
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